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 1 
Burke W. Griggs 
THE POLITICAL CULTURES OF IRRIGATION 
AND THE PROXY BATTLES OF INTERSTATE 
WATER LITIGATION 
ABSTRACT 
Groundwater depletion ignores the political boundaries of 
western states, the legal boundaries of western water codes, and 
the jurisdictional boundaries of western water federalism. In the 
wake of the groundwater revolution, it is becoming apparent that 
certain interstate lawsuits derive essentially from deeper 
conflicts rooted in the clash between surface-water and 
groundwater irrigation communities—and their respective 
political cultures. The interstate divide may be yielding to the 
hydrological divide.   
 
This article attends to that deeper relationship between irrigation 
agriculture and political culture across the Great Plains. Part I 
provides a brief history of its surface-water irrigation 
communities, to compose a recognizable image of their political 
culture: one that is rooted in classical western water law and 
cooperative water federalism, and depends upon interstate 
compacts and federal irrigation projects. Part II surveys the 
groundwater revolution and the distinct political culture it has 
generated: one that doubts the merits of classical western water 
law, and suspects the power of western water federalism.   
 
Part III describes a revealing theater of the conflict between 
these political cultures: the Republican River Basin. On the 
surface, the conflict is a legal casus belli between sovereign 
states. But beneath that conflict lies a deeper and more 
intractable conflict, where interstate litigation becomes 
recognizable as a proxy battle between surface-water and 
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groundwater irrigation communities. How the states and the 
United States resolve this deeper conflict may determine the 
future of water federalism across the Great Plains—and the fate 
of the rivers upon which its communities depend. 
INTRODUCTION 
Organized selfishness is more potent than unorganized 
consideration for the public interests. 
—Elwood Mead1 
 
All farmers get their water from somewhere. In the East, water just falls 
from the sky, but across the arid West, farmers must get it elsewhere. For centuries 
it has come with difficulty from the West’s sparse and irregular river systems, 
which depend upon variable, but annual, melt from mountain snowpack, local 
precipitation, and reservoirs. Since the 1950s, however, most irrigation water has 
come dependably from the ground, from shallow alluvial systems and deeper 
aquifers, first in deceptively increasing volumes, but now in permanently 
decreasing ones, as groundwater levels decline for good. The depletion of the 
West’s groundwater is a national problem of high order.2 Geologists have sounded 
alarms.3 Policy wonks have prescribed legal and technocratic solutions.4 
Washington has sent emissaries asserting jurisdiction and money promising relief; 
the West has welcomed the latter.5 Western politicians have issued platitudes and 
published water plans.6 But obscured behind all of this credentialed, politicized, 
and often-posturing expertise is a simple, hard, but useful fact: it matters a great 
deal where western irrigators get their water. 
It matters because the source of that irrigation water largely defines the 
political culture of the community that depends on it.7 The relationship between 
 
 1. ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS: A DISCUSSION OF THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
QUESTIONS CREATED BY THE GROWTH OF IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE IN THE WEST 87 (1903). 
 2. See, e.g., Laura Parker, To the Last Drop, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 2016, at 86-111. 
 3. V. L. MCGUIRE, U. S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER-LEVEL CHANGES IN THE HIGH PLAINS 
AQUIFER, PREDEVELOPMENT TO 2007, 2005-06, AND 2006-07, 1 (2009); LEONARD F. KONIKOW, U.S. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUNDWATER DEPLETION IN THE UNITED STATES (1900–2008), at 5 (2013); 
Stephanie L. Castle et al., Groundwater Depletion during Drought Threatens Future Water Capacity of 
the Colorado River Basin, 41 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 5904-11 (2014). 
 4. See, e.g., ROBERT GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA’S WATER CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT (2009); THE WATER PROBLEM: CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES (Pat Mulroy ed., 2017). 
 5. For a recent rebuke of the federal emissaries, see Proposed Directive on Groundwater Resource 
Management, Forest Service Manual 2560, 80 Fed. Reg. 35,299 (June 19, 2015). For federal subsidies 
which retire farm ground from irrigation, see 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831–3835 (2012) (creating the Conservation 
Reserve and Enhancement Program). 
 6. See, e.g., COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., COLORADO’S WATER PLAN (2015); KANSAS 
WATER OFFICE, A LONG-TERM VISION FOR THE FUTURE OF WATER SUPPLY IN KANSAS (2015). 
 7. See, e.g., WILLIAM DUBUYS & ALEX HARRIS, RIVER OF TRAPS: A NEW MEXICO MOUNTAIN 
LIFE (1990); JOSÉ A. RIVERA, ACEQUIA CULTURE: WATER, LAND AND COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST 
(1998) (describing the role which local, community-based acequias play in the political cultures of 
Winter 2017 POLITICAL CULTURES OF IRRIGATION 3 
irrigation and political culture is an ancient one.8 Across the nineteenth-century 
West, surface-water irrigation communities established most of western water law, 
built (or had built for them) most of the West’s irrigation infrastructure, and framed 
most of the legal and regulatory systems that still secure property rights in water.9 
John Wesley Powell and Elwood Mead, two of the most influential proponents of 
federal irrigation in the American West, believed that the relationship between 
irrigation and political culture was as real as western aridity itself, and should guide 
the development of irrigation projects on a basin-wide scale.10 During the 1940s, 
1950s, and 1960s, western states and the United States, largely through the Bureau 
of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), built 
dams, reservoirs and surface-water irrigation projects across the Great Plains. 
These projects remained steadfast to Reclamation’s essentially technocratic vision 
of rural society, where citizen irrigators would own modest farms organized around 
the projects’ reservoirs, canals, and irrigated lands.11 
Due to their basin-wide designs, these projects supply water to irrigators 
in different states. The Corps built John Martin Reservoir in the lower Arkansas 
River Basin of eastern Colorado, to assist in the management of long-established 
canal systems constructed according to state law in both Colorado and Kansas.12 
Within comparatively undeveloped basins such as the Republican River Basin 
(Basin), the Corps and Reclamation built reservoirs such as Harlan County Lake to 
supply the Bostwick Project, which straddles the Nebraska-Kansas state line.13 
These surface water irrigation works depend largely on the governance structures 
of cooperative federalism. The states protected both their respective water supplies 
and their respective state law water regimes through the federalist medium of the 
interstate compact. The United States built the projects, and provided important 
technical and administrative assistance as well. 
These irrigation projects also depend upon the rivers themselves; yet they 
became operational during a pivotal period in western irrigation. Starting in the 
1950s, the development of groundwater supplies across the Great Plains 
fundamentally transformed agriculture in the region—and groundwater irrigators 
 
Spanish-American communities in the Upper Rio Grande Basin in New Mexico and Colorado). See also 
Reclamation literature cited infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 8. See generally IRRIGATION CIVILIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Julian Haynes Steward 
ed., 1955) (describing a collection of monographs exploring the relationship between irrigation and 
society in ancient China and Mesopotamia, and pre-Columbian Peru and Mesoamerica). 
 9. See DONALD PISANI, FROM THE FAMILY FARM TO AGRIBUSINESS: THE IRRIGATION CRUSADE 
IN CALIFORNIA AND THE WEST, 1850–1931 (1984); NORRIS HUNDLEY JR., THE GREAT THIRST: 
CALIFORNIANS AND WATER: A HISTORY (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
California, rev. ed. 2001). 
 10. John Wesley Powell, Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States: With a More 
Detailed Account of the Lands of Utah, in THE ARID LANDS, 33–36 (Wallace Stagner ed., repr., Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, rev. ed. 2004) (1879)); MEAD, supra note 1, at 41. 
 11. DONALD WORSTER, UNDER WESTERN SKIES: NATURE AND HISTORY IN THE AMERICAN WEST 
62 (1992). 
 12. Arkansas River Compact, ch. 155, 63 Stat. 145 (1949) (asserting that a major purpose of the 
compact is to share in the benefits of John Martin Reservoir). 
 13. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BOSTWICK DEFINITE PLAN REPORT 5 
(1953). 
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developed their own distinctive political culture in the process. Groundwater and its 
political culture have since assumed a dominant position across the Great Plains, 
where as much as 90 percent of irrigation water comes from beneath the ground.14 
That dominance has challenged and transformed western water law, threatened 
western water infrastructure, and frustrated the regulatory systems of most western 
states, regardless of their distinct water law codes. The groundwater revolution 
promised emancipation from the governance systems of Reclamation projects and 
the allocation limits of interstate compacts.15 Like many revolutions, it temporarily 
made the past obsolete.16 But seven decades on, the revolution has produced a 
revolution’s typical excesses, conjuring the real specter of permanent groundwater 
depletion.17 Falling groundwater levels have crippled wells and dried up formerly 
perennial streams across the Great Plains, desiccating Major Powell’s “arid lands” 
even further.18 
As pumping caused declines in streamflows, reservoir supplies, and 
groundwater levels across the West during the 1970s, conflicts emerged between 
states dependent on interstate water supplies. The effective governance of these 
supplies by interstate compact administrations began to break down, and the 
groundwater revolution ultimately forced a series of interstate “water wars” 
litigated under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.19 Texas sued New 
Mexico to restrain its excessive upstream groundwater pumping in the Pecos River 
Basin, pursuant to the Pecos River Compact.20 Kansas sued Colorado to reduce 
similarly excessive pumping in Colorado’s portion of the Arkansas River Basin, 
pursuant to the Arkansas River Compact.21 And Kansas sued Nebraska twice, to do 
the same in Nebraska’s portion of the Republican River Basin, pursuant to the 
Republican River Compact (Compact). The first round of the Republican River 
litigation had the effect of integrating groundwater pumping explicitly within the 
Compact’s administration of those supplies, by accounting for depletions to 
 
 14. This figure is for Kansas. CHARLES A. PERRY, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, EFFECTS OF 
IRRIGATION PRACTICES ON WATER USE IN THE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICTS WITHIN THE 
KANSAS HIGH PLAINS, 1991–2003, 1 (2006). 
 15. JAMES AUCOIN, WATER IN NEBRASKA: USE, POLITICS, POLICIES 39 (1984); see infra note 208 
and accompanying text. 
 16. See generally CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION (1965) (characterizing 
“uniformities” across the landmark English, American, French, and Russian Revolutions). 
 17. See Castle et al., supra note 3, at 5909–10. 
 18. Kan. Geological Survey, Major Perennial Stream Changes from 1961 to 2009, KAN. HIGH 
PLAINS AQUIFER ATLAS, http://www.kgs.ku.edu/HighPlains/HPA_Atlas/Aquifer%20Basics/#Perennial_ 
Stream_Changes_1961_to_2009.jpg [https://perma.cc/DB3D-X9HN]. 
 19. See e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983). The media overuses this metaphor, but 
the Supreme Court depends upon it. The Court only accepts interstate water lawsuits if the “dispute 
between States [is] of such seriousness that it would amount to casus belli if the States were fully 
sovereign.” Id. at 571 n.18 (1983) (citing North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372–74 (1923), and 
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519–21 (1906)). 
 20. See Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983) (No. 65, Orig.); see also Texas v. New Mexico, 
482 U.S. 124 (1987) (No. 65, Orig.). Litigation lasted from 1974 through 1990. 
 21. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001) (No. 105, Orig.). Litigation lasted from 1985 through 
2009. 
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streamflow.22 The second round enforced the Compact against Nebraska’s repeated 
violations caused by excessive groundwater pumping.23 In all of these cases, 
groundwater was held to be an integral part of the interstate water supplies 
allocated under their respective compacts.24 
Like the interstate lawsuits of the earlier period (1902–1945), these legal 
wars pitted one state against another for sound legal reasons. The Constitution 
assigns the litigation of interstate disputes to the original jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court.25 The Court’s jurisprudence regarding interstate water 
controversies makes clear that wronged downstream irrigators cannot fight wars on 
their own; their parent state must fight them on their behalf.26 And the Court’s 
interstate compact jurisprudence similarly makes clear that irrigators are bound to 
the allocation limits imposed by interstate compacts, because those limits are 
federal law and trump prior state-law water rights.27 Across both major periods of 
interstate litigation, none of these textbook truisms are controversial; indeed, they 
are wise and necessary rules of water governance, given the interstate nature of 
basin-wide water conflicts. 
Yet like water itself, wars over water do not respect legal boundaries, the 
political boundaries of western states, or the jurisdictional boundaries of western 
water federalism. In the turbulent wake of the groundwater revolution, it is 
becoming increasingly apparent that certain interstate lawsuits derive essentially 
from deeper internecine conflicts within the party states themselves; and these 
conflicts are rooted in the intractable clash between surface-water and groundwater 
irrigation and their respective political cultures. The interstate divide may be 
yielding to the hydrological divide. The most fitting example of this problem is the 
spate of litigation which has troubled the Compact since 1998—at the Supreme 
Court, but perhaps more importantly, in the telling aftermath of the Court’s 
decisions in those cases, as surface-water irrigators in both Nebraska and Kansas 
have fought to protect themselves against Nebraska’s groundwater-driven Compact 
compliance policies. Within this larger landscape, the interstate litigation becomes 
recognizable as a proxy battle, part of a larger conflict between surface and 
groundwater interests. 
The Supreme Court decides interstate lawsuits as a matter of course, but it 
does not necessarily resolve their underlying causes.28 There are defensible 
 
 22. Final Settlement Stipulation at 32-34, C1-C114, Kansas v. Nebraska, 123 S.Ct. 1898 (Apr. 16, 
2003) (No. 126, Orig.) (accounting procedures established to evaluate the impact of groundwater 
pumping on the states’ respective allocations). 
 23. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015). 
 24. First Report of the Special Master at 37, Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720 (Jan. 28, 2000) (No. 
126, Orig.). 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Interstate jurisdiction is exclusive. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
 26. Colorado v. Kansas, 322 U.S. 708 (1944) (enjoining Kansas irrigation ditch companies from 
prosecuting further their federal cases against Colorado ditch companies upstream on the Arkansas 
River). However, the Court occasionally allows non-state parties to intervene in original actions. See, 
e.g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 267–68 (2010). 
 27. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 108–09 (1938). 
 28. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117–18 (1907) (asserting the principle of equitable 
apportionment but declining to so apportion the waters of the Arkansas River between Colorado and 
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federalist reasons for such reticence. The Court is rarely willing to interfere with 
the states’ state-law based interstate compliance regimes.29 However vaguely, 
federal water law, especially reclamation law, largely defers to state water law.30 
This default of deference in resolving interstate water disputes has allowed the 
deeper conflict between surface-water and groundwater irrigation communities to 
survive, which raises a serious problem. For the future of many interstate river 
basins, especially Great Plains basins which depend principally on groundwater, 
may not depend so much upon whether upstream states comply with their interstate 
legal obligations, but rather upon how they comply with them—by reducing their 
groundwater pumping, by reducing their surface-water diversions, by importing 
water from somewhere else, or by some combination of all three. These choices 
matter a great deal. They may determine the hydrological integrity of the rivers 
themselves. 
Who will make these choices? Across the Great Plains, the contrasts and 
conflicts between surface-water and groundwater irrigation communities raise hard 
but unavoidable questions about the public. What is this public: a regional, basin-
wide, and therefore interstate public? Is it a statewide public, and therefore 
determined by political borders that are blind to the course of western drainages? 
Or is it—at least at its most intensely felt level—a local public, and one limited to 
those who hold water rights? For unlike natural resources such as hard-rock 
minerals or oil and gas, water in the West is typically dedicated to the people as a 
public resource, subject to the appropriation and beneficial use that create a private 
property water right.31 And unlike other natural-resource use rights, such as timber 
leases in national forests or grazing rights on federal land, most water rights are 
state-law real property rights, insulated from federal jurisdiction.32 Water can thus 
be the most public but the least publicly protected of all western resources.33 As 
these irrigation communities continue their internecine conflicts within their federal 
and state theaters, and western states make policy choices concerning how to 
comply with their interstate water obligations, they are increasingly negotiating 
among these competing and often divergent concepts of the public. The concept of 
the public that prevails determines those policy and governance choices, and those 
 
Kansas); see also Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 399–400 (1943) (declining to award relief to 
Kansas). 
 29. Report of the Special Master at 112–19, Kansas v. Nebraska, 134 S.Ct. 981 (Nov. 15, 2013) 
(No. 126, Orig.). 
 30. The nature and extent of this deference has been frequently litigated concerning Section 8 of the 
Reclamation Act. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 390 (codified in part at 43 U.S.C. §§ 
372, 383 (2006)). For useful commentaries on Section 8, see Amy Kelley, Staging a Comeback: Section 
8 of the Reclamation Act, 18 U. CAL. DAVIS. L. REV. 97, 99–125 (1984); Reed Benson, New Adventures 
of the Old Bureau: Modern-Day Reclamation Statutes and Congress’s Unfinished Environmental 
Business, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 137, 158 (2011). 
 31. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-706 (2015) (dedicating all of the waters of the State of 
Kansas to the public, subject to the rights of prior appropriation). 
 32. Id. § 82a-701(g). 
 33. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 951 (1982) (describing, in a commerce clause case, the 
state’s ownership of its waters as “a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people 
that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource” (citations 
omitted)). 
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choices will in turn decide the future of rivers that—for now at least—still run 
across the Great Plains. 
Because these choices lie with the states and not the Supreme Court, we 
must refocus our attention on the relationship between irrigation agriculture and 
political culture across the Great Plains. This article is an attempt toward renewing 
that focus. It surveys the way irrigation agriculture has created two distinct 
communities and political cultures across the Great Plains: the older communities 
based on surface-water irrigation projects which depend upon river flows; and the 
younger communities based on groundwater pumping, whose connection to Great 
Plains river systems is both hydrologically variable and legally contested.34 While 
scholars and other experts have long studied the political culture of irrigation, they 
have paid far less attention to this important distinction.35 
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of surface-water irrigation 
communities across the Great Plains, to compose a recognizable image of their 
political culture. Between the 1859 Colorado Gold Rush and 1960 or so, these 
communities developed first as private enterprises, and then as state and federal 
projects. Concentrated in the river valleys and near the irrigation systems that made 
their farms viable, they developed a political culture inseparable from the water law 
they helped to establish, the water-related infrastructure they helped to build, and 
the governmental largesse upon which they have long depended. Great Plains 
surface water irrigation communities are clustered around their projects and 
organized along corporate lines; they fully intend to be permanent. They are also 
legally conservative communities: they generally perceive their interests as 
compatible with the laws and regulations which protect their water supply, and they 
have traditionally perceived these interests to be compatible with those of the wider 
public. Likewise, the public has traditionally supported these communities, through 
state laws giving them quasi-public powers and through the federal fisc, with funds 
diverted, stored, released, and applied by Reclamation and the Corps. 
Groundwater irrigation communities occupy a hydrological and legal 
terrain that is markedly different than their surface-water counterparts. Part II of 
this Article provides a survey of the groundwater revolution, to show how it 
generated its own political culture across the Great Plains. Starting in the 1950s, 
groundwater irrigation revolutionized Great Plains agriculture. Groundwater was 
not burdened by the necessities and limitations which have long defined surface 
water projects: their dams, reservoirs, canals, and laterals; their high capital costs; 
their need for corporate coordination; and perhaps most importantly, the 
longstanding structures of water rights, state regulation, and federal supervision. 
Groundwater irrigators exploited these advantages, and in the process 
have generated a distinct and powerful political culture, one that is also inseparable 
from their water supply. They are dispersed across regional aquifers, rather than 
nucleated around surface water projects. They are comparatively impermanent, 
even as they are closely connected to their local economies, which are dominated 
 
 34. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
 35. For example, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A NEW ERA FOR IRRIGATION (1996); and 
HUNDLEY, supra note 9, at 69–75, describing the political culture of miners during the California Gold 
Rush. 
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by the irrigation of feed crops for beef and dairy cattle. Because groundwater 
irrigators depend upon their individual and legally independent wells, groundwater 
irrigation communities are defined by a common aversion to regulation, rather than 
by a common water-supply system. They are dubious, rather than defensive, about 
the merits of established western water law. Perhaps most importantly, they are 
pressured between two incontrovertible but incompatible facts—that of 
groundwater’s present economic dominance, and that of its permanent depletion. 
Protective of their individual access to water and of their local control over water 
regulation, groundwater irrigation communities perceive their interests as distinct 
and generally incompatible with state control, and as separate from the concerns of 
the public beyond their own water neighborhoods. State governments, water 
agencies, and the public have often returned the favor, by providing politically 
unacceptable proposals to stem excessive groundwater pumping.36 
Part III of this Article describes an especially revealing theater of the 
conflict between surface-water and groundwater irrigation communities: the basin 
of the Republican River, a quintessential Great Plains river whose tributaries and 
mainstem gather groundwater supplies across northeastern Colorado, southern 
Nebraska, and northern Kansas. Since the 1980s, the conflict has manifested itself 
most prominently at the interstate level, as Kansas has twice sued Nebraska to 
enforce the Compact. The first case (1998–2003) resolved that the states would 
have to account for the effects of groundwater pumping on their respective 
Compact allocations; and the states, with important technical assistance from the 
United States, developed a groundwater model to calculate those effects and to 
assist in Compact accounting.37 Kansas brought the second case in 2010, to enforce 
the Compact against Nebraska’s noncompliance in 2005 and 2006. The Court 
resolved that case by awarding Kansas monetary damages for Nebraska’s 
noncompliance, but also by ordering a modification of the accounting that 
Nebraska had sought; both Kansas and Nebraska could claim partial victories in the 
interstate litigation.38 
Yet to focus on the high level of Supreme Court litigation is to miss the 
larger, lower, but more important legal landscape, one dominated by Nebraska’s 
policy to comply with the Compact by subordinating its surface-water irrigation 
communities to those which depend upon groundwater. Groundwater irrigation 
communities in Colorado and Nebraska have taken control of the relevant water 
law and policy in their portions of the Basin, largely to forestall forced reductions 
in groundwater pumping. That policy has produced a situation where the political 
boundaries between the compacting states have begun to matter less than the 
operative legal and hydrological boundaries between surface water and 
groundwater. Irrigators’ allegiances to their parent state are becoming less 
important than their connection to their water supply. 
 
 36. See John C. Peck, Property Rights in Groundwater: Some Lessons from the Kansas Experience, 
12 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 501, 505–06 (2002) (describing how political opposition to 
sustainability killed the “two-pool approach” espoused by the Kansas Water Office in 2001). 
 37. Final Report of the Special Master with Certificate of Adoption of RRCA Groundwater Model 
at 6–7, Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720 (Sept. 17, 2003) (No. 126, Orig.) [hereinafter Final Report]. 
 38. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1057, 1059–64 (2015). 
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Threatened and vulnerable, surface-water irrigation communities are 
looking beyond their state governments to find other means to protect themselves. 
During the Supreme Court litigation, Nebraska surface-water irrigation interests 
supported Kansas and its surface-water irrigators. At the same time, they have 
engaged in multiple lawsuits against Nebraska to obtain relief from its compliance 
approach, which they believe threatens their very existence. Reclamation has 
consistently announced its disapproval of Nebraska’s approach, but it has yet to 
defend its irrigation districts in court. Since the interstate litigation concluded in 
2015, the Republican River Compact Administration (RRCA) has worked to 
resolve some of the causes of the interstate dispute, but its peacemaking is 
transforming the operation of the Compact itself. The Compact was originally 
intended as a means to secure Reclamation irrigation and flood-control projects for 
the compacting states, consistent with both the principles of cooperative federalism 
and the purposes of Reclamation itself. Yet as groundwater pumping has 
increasingly dominated the Basin, the states’ administration of the Compact has 
taken a distinctly anti-federal turn, and the RRCA has achieved interstate comity 
largely by opposing Reclamation. As a consequence, surface water irrigators within 
the Basin, but especially Nebraska, find themselves caught between two hostile 
parents: the state-law compliance policies of their parent states, which they must 
obey, and Reclamation’s response to these policies, upon which they depend. 
I. SURFACE WATER IRRIGATION COMMUNITIES AND THEIR 
POLITICAL CULTURE 
A. Western Peculiarity and the Prior Appropriation Doctrine 
The political culture of Great Plains surface-water irrigation communities 
begins with their claim to water, and that claim is rooted in a longstanding 
sensibility about how westerners should govern their water supplies—primarily 
through the prior appropriation doctrine. The doctrine combines the rule of capture 
with the rule of priority. Under the rule of capture, a person who diverts and 
captures unclaimed water from its source and puts that water to a recognized 
beneficial use obtains a property interest in the use of that water, a water right.39 A 
prior appropriation right may be severed from the riparian or other water-bearing 
land from which the water is diverted, allowing the water to be used elsewhere. 
Under the rule of priority, first in time is first in right. In dry years, there is no 
equitable sharing of a water shortage—as there is in the eastern doctrine of riparian 
rights—because this sharing would make all users so short of water that no one 
could make productive use of his share.40 Rather, a senior water right receives its 
full allocation before a junior right receives any. Prior appropriation rights can be 
conveyed separately from appurtenant land, and the priority of the right transfers 
with the conveyance.41 
 
 39. For an early explanation of the rule of capture applied to water, see Acton v. Blundell (1843) 
152 Eng. Rep. 1223; 12 M. & W. 324 (Exch. Chamber). 
 40. Armstrong v. Larimer County Ditch Co., 27 P. 235, 237 (Colo. App. 1891). 
 41. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(g) (2015). 
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This is not the place, and this place lacks the space, to provide an extended 
history of the general doctrine.42 That is just as well. Most readers of the Journal 
are probably familiar with the doctrine and with the longstanding debates over its 
efficacy and worth.43 The doctrine also varies significantly in its application across 
the Great Plains states, which undercuts the utility of an extensive treatment of the 
general doctrine anyway.44 For the purposes of this article, three aspects of the 
doctrine require emphasis. 
First, the prior appropriation doctrine largely derives from the widely held 
belief that the West was a peculiar place. Western territories were established with 
the assumption that they would be best governed through the received Anglo-
American common law.45 With water, however, such a belief was turned on its 
head. Prospectors entering the Sierra Nevada foothills of Alta California in the 
1840s were soon understood to be entering a wilderness bereft of law, an act which 
“was itself a breach of precedent. They left behind them much of the established 
law of real property.”46 
The peculiarity of the West’s natural conditions affirmed its historical 
peculiarity, further undercutting Anglo-American legal precedents founded upon 
received assumptions of plentiful, accessible water supplies. It is a well-known fact 
that the West’s severe aridity effectively prohibits agriculture without irrigation; 
the region’s meteorological and topographical conditions make matters worse.47 In 
the mountains and their foothills, most annual precipitation falls as snow, which 
typically melts into spring torrents too early for use during the West’s shorter 
growing season.48 On the Great Plains, precipitation occurs mostly during the 
growing season, but sporadically and variably, posing similar problems for making 
 
 42. For older surveys of the development of the prior appropriation doctrine, see MEAD, supra note 
1 (a largely critical treatment from a water management perspective); SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS 
IN THE WESTERN STATES (1905); for more recent surveys, see DONALD J. PISANI, TO RECLAIM A 
DIVIDED WEST: WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1848–1902 (1992); 1 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, 
WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 226–650 (1971); HUNDLEY, supra note 9, at 
60–63. 
 43. See, e.g., David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws 
and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States’ Role? 20 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3 (2001) (focusing on federal 
environmental law and state law modifications to the doctrine); Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Priority: The 
Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32 ENVTL. L. 37 (2002) (defending the utility of the doctrine 
largely based on federal environmental law and Colorado state court decisions); Reed D. Benson, Alive 
but Irrelevant: The Prior Appropriation Doctrine in Today’s Western Water Law, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 
675, 690–704 (2012) (discussing an assortment of state law cases). 
 44. Compare NEB. CONST. ART. XV, § 6 (1920) (explicitly espousing a use hierarchy and 
protecting certain uses above others, a hierarchy which has been repeatedly enforced) and In re 2007 
Administrations of Appropriations of Niobrara River, 820 N.W.2d 44 (Neb. 2012), with KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 82a-707(b) (appearing to state a use hierarchy, but repudiating it at the same time). 
 45. See e.g., Act of 1855, ch. 96, Kan. Sess. Laws 469; Act of Mar. 16, 1855, 1855 Neb. Laws 328 
(adopting the common law of England in the territories of Kansas and Nebraska). 
 46. WIEL, supra note 42, at 2.  
 47. Powell, supra note 10, at 12–13; MEAD, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 48. MEAD, supra note 1, at 48. 
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effective use of the rains that do fall.49 Topographically, the West’s greatest water 
supplies are stored in mountain snowpack distant from the lower, fertile, and more 
temperate lands which are most amenable to cultivation.50 
These historical and natural peculiarities raised hard and “novel 
questions” for the courts, which struggled to apply the riparian doctrine to conflicts 
growing out of the “peculiar enterprises in which many of the people of this state 
are embarked”—most prominently placer mining, which required that water be 
diverted away from streams and rivers and put to use elsewhere.51 In working these 
water-intensive mining claims, usually beyond the reach of state and federal 
authorities, miners had applied mining customs to water: the first to divert and use 
water from a stream had an exclusive right to use that water, even if the site of that 
use was distant from the point of diversion.52 These rules clearly conflicted with 
common law riparianism, especially its requirement that water be used on the site 
of its diversion, thus prohibiting severance of the water right’s place of use from its 
point of diversion. Because the riparian doctrine frustrated the beneficial use of 
water in much of the West, its legitimacy went increasingly unrecognized. 
The combined force of these peculiarities eventually convinced the courts. 
In 1855, the case of Irwin v. Phillips provided a convenient opportunity to do so. 
Like earlier cases, it pitted a riparian landowner against a prior appropriator; but 
because the conflict took place on public land, the California Supreme Court did 
not consider itself to be constrained by riparian statutes nullifying the legal effect 
of the miners’ customs.53 That opening allowed the court to give those customs the 
sanction of the common law. Stressing a common law maxim—that “courts are 
bound to take notice of the political and social condition of the country, which they 
judicially rule”—the court then departed from common law riparianism. It held that 
the right of the prior appropriator to divert water from a stream, convey it to 
another site, and use it there was a superior claim to that of a rival whose land 
bordered the stream, and who would otherwise have prevailed as a riparian owner 
under the common law.54 As it had in Eddy v. Simpson, the court stressed “the 
peculiar condition” of the mining camps and their legal customs, which recognized 
and protected property rights in an orderly and fair manner.55 Just two years after 
 
 49. H.A. RICE & ROGER C. RICE, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE RELATION OF THE KANSAS 
WATER COMMISSION TO THE FLOOD PROBLEM OF KANSAS 9 (1918) (precipitation over the Kansas 
portion of the Great Plains is of the “plains type,” which mostly falls during the growing season). 
 50. MEAD, supra note 1, at 70–71. 
 51. Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 253 (1853). 
 52. WIEL, supra note 46, at 2–4; HUTCHINS, supra note 42, at 164. 
 53. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855). This finding drew the accusation of judicial activism, 
and the court later defended itself against this charge by explaining that taking judicial notice of local 
customs was an established precept of the very common law the legislature had statutorily adopted at 
statehood. See Conger v. Weaver, 6 Cal. 548 (1856). 
 54. Irwin, 5 Cal. at 146. 
 55. Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Cal. 46, 48 (1857). The Supreme Court of the United States later agreed, 
blessing the pioneers as “emphatically the law-makers, as respects mining, upon the public lands in this 
State.” Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457–58 (1879). 
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Irwin, the California Supreme Court stated that the doctrine had become “too long 
settled to admit of any doubt or discussion at this time.”56 
The confidence of such a judicial statement raises the second relevant 
aspect concerning prior appropriation: it enjoyed the status of an established, 
legitimate, and widely recognized custom and practice well before the courts 
accepted it. Across the West, the prior appropriation doctrine rapidly attained the 
status of official legal orthodoxy with similar rapidity. Federal mining legislation 
enacted soon after the Civil War expressly protected water rights obtained under 
the doctrine.57 The 1859 Gold Rush brought the doctrine to Colorado, where it soon 
collided with pre-existing water doctrines, especially in the San Luis Valley, which 
had been settled by Spanish-American and Mormon farmers irrigating from the Rio 
Grande since the 1840s.58 Spanish and Spanish-American water law allocated short 
water supplies according to need, rather than temporal priority.59 Mormon legal 
customs assumed collective rather than individual rights to use water.60 In 1861, the 
territorial legislature endorsed the principle of rotating water rights in times of 
shortage.61 It also made water rights inseparable from the appurtenant land, raising 
the same doctrinal conflict which had recently been resolved in California by Irwin 
v. Phillips.62 
Colorado enshrined the prior appropriation doctrine in its constitution at 
statehood in 1876, protecting water rights so secured; but because the constitutional 
provisions did not repudiate the earlier riparian doctrines, the potential for doctrinal 
conflict remained.63 The claims of a riparian landowner (and appurtenant water 
user) whose land patent preceded the diversion claims of a prior appropriator might 
still prevail.64 Concerned to protect the water rights of irrigation companies secured 
by prior appropriation, the Colorado Supreme Court repudiated riparianism in 
1882.65 Specifically, it discredited the issue of doctrinal pluralism prior to 1861. 
Prior appropriation was the exclusive rule in Colorado, not only because the state 
constitution recognized it, but also because it had “existed from the date of the 
 
 56. Hill v. King, 8 Cal. 336, 338 (1857). Advocates for common law riparianism vigorously 
contested Irwin. See Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136, 141–42 (1857). However, later cases failed to 
overturn Irwin. See, e.g., McDonald v. Bear River Co., 13 Cal. 220 (1859); Logan v. Driscoll, 19 Cal. 
623 (1862). 
 57. See, e.g., Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 253 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 51); Placer Act 
of 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 218, (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 52). 
 58. VIRGINIA MCCONNELL SIMMONS, THE SAN LUIS VALLEY: LAND OF THE SIX-ARMED CROSS 
219–224 (2nd ed. 1999). 
 59. MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST: A SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY, 
1550–1850, at 20–23, 147–64 (1996); see also JOHN O. BAXTER, DIVIDING NEW MEXICO’S WATERS, 
1700–1912 (1997). 
 60. MEAD, supra note 1, at 42–44, 233. 
 61. Id. at 144. 
 62. See Act of Nov. 5, 1861, 1861 Colo. Sess. Laws 67, § 1; Act of Aug. 15, 1862, 1862 Colo. 
Sess. Laws 48, § 13. Mead noted the 1861 laws that required water rights to be permanently fixed to the 
lands where they were used; similar laws were adopted in Wyoming in 1876. See MEAD, supra note 1, 
at 83. 
 63. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6 (1876) 
 64. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886). 
 65. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co, 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882). 
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earliest appropriations of water within the boundaries of this state.”66 Conjectural 
history proved to be as powerful in Colorado as it had been in California: in a 
territory “without law,” each prospector “brought with him the principles of equity 
and justice,” establishing the rules of prior appropriation, which later corporations 
and settlers would eventually recognize.67 Influenced by these precedents, Kansas 
recognized prior appropriation in 1876.68 Nebraska followed in 1889 and 
incorporated the doctrine in its constitution by amendment in 1920.69 
Ethnic conflict between Anglo-Americans and Spanish Americans, as well 
as the cultural imperialism of Anglo-American common law, certainly played a 
role in the triumph of prior appropriation, especially on the upper Rio Grande.70 
That underscores the third relevant aspect concerning prior appropriation: a 
powerful justification for the doctrine was that of reliance. The dominant irrigation 
culture of the West in 1885 or so—Anglo-American surface-water irrigation 
interests—had invested heavily in water rights secured under the doctrine, and had 
constructed reservoirs and irrigation and delivery systems which depended on the 
doctrine’s swift deployment during times of water shortage. Frank Trelease 
memorably wrote that in the West, “priority is equity,” as opposed to the methods 
of equitably apportioning short supplies under riparian doctrines.71 Wider notions 
of fairness and the contemporary political context also played important roles, 
supplementing the historical, meteorological, and topographical arguments for prior 
appropriation. Given the politically powerful concerns about land and water 
monopolies, appropriation rights became severable from land.72 Given the need for 
diligence and concerns about speculation, water rights became subject to 
abandonment.73 
Yet there is that other equity, defined not as fairness but as capital 
investment, which was arguably more compelling. Given the difficulty and expense 
 
 66. Id. at 446. For a fuller discussion of this apparent contradiction, see Gregory A. Hicks & Devon 
G. Peña, Community Acequias in Colorado’s Rio Culebra Watershed: A Customary Commons in the 
Domain of Prior Appropriation, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 387, 400 (2003). 
 67. Armstrong v. Larimer County Ditch Co., 27 P. 235, 237 (Colo. App. 1891). 
 68. Act of Mar. 4, 1876, ch. 58, 1876 Kan. Sess. Laws 153. 
 69. Act of Mar. 27, 1889, ch. 68, 1889 Neb. Laws 503; NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6 (1920) (“The 
right to divert unappropriated waters of every natural stream for beneficial use shall never be denied 
except when such denial is demanded by the public interest”). 
 70. See MALCOLM EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS & LAWSUITS IN NORTHERN NEW MEXICO 11–54 
(1994). 
 71. Frank J. Trelease, State Water and State Lines: Commerce in Water Resources, 56 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 347, 349 (1985). 
 72. DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 104–38 (2012). Mead opposed severability, on the 
grounds that it promoted speculation and monopoly. See MEAD, supra note 1, at 290. For the parallel 
problem of split estates in land and water rights, see infra text accompanying note 99. 
 73. SCHORR, supra note 72, at 116–17. Without appropriation and use, there is no industry, and so 
the right disappears; this is the logic behind the so-called “use it or lose it” principle, which holds that 
unused rights are forfeited or abandoned. See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 42-308 (2012) (rights not used 
for three years forfeited). Modern abandonment statutes are less severe. See id. § 82a-718 (2015) (rights 
not used for five years “without due and sufficient cause” deemed abandoned, but multiple and lenient 
exceptions exist to prevent forfeiture); see also Frick Farm Props. v. Kansas Dept. of Agric., 190 P.3d 
983 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008). 
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of diversion works, the law needed to afford clear and immediate protections to 
senior rights during times of shortage. Given the distance between upstream storage 
reservoirs and downstream irrigation and municipal uses, storage rights and 
irrigation ditches required legal protections and privileges.74 Buyers and sellers also 
relied also on the very numeracy of prior appropriation. The priority date of a water 
right transferred with its sale; and quantified diversion amounts provided (or at 
least appeared to provide) values not necessarily available under the riparian 
doctrine’s reasonableness approach.75 Courts could employ these numbers in 
assessing damages for unauthorized or out-of-priority diversions; buyers and sellers 
could use them (along with the priority of the right) to measure the right’s worth. 
Constitutional provisions and statutory enactments did not introduce the doctrine 
but rather recognized it, acknowledging its political and cultural authority, and the 
imperative need to protect the property rights it had secured. 
B. Irrigation, Disposition, and Reclamation 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, surface-water irrigation 
communities developed across the Great Plains. In Colorado, that development 
began along the South Platte and the Cache la Poudre Rivers, assisted by favorable 
conditions on the Front Range.76 In 1870, the Union Colony’s Greeley Irrigation 
Company began its community irrigation system, which watered thirty thousand 
acres along the Cache la Poudre. Similar projects developed along the South Platte 
and Arkansas Rivers. By 1884, Colorado had developed more than a million acres 
of irrigated land.77 In western Kansas, the five main irrigation canals on the 
Arkansas River had been developed by the 1880s, irrigating approximately 65,000 
acres.78 Surface-water irrigation communities also sprang up in the valleys of more 
remote basins, such as the North Fork Republican River in Colorado, the South 
Platte in Nebraska, and even the Cimarron River Valley in southwestern Kansas.79 
Prior appropriation gained legal approval largely through a benevolent 
view of how miners and irrigators created property rights in water beyond the grasp 
of government.80 The disposition of the public domain over the same period reveals 
a darker aspect to how claimants obtained water rights within government—
especially the federal government’s ham-fisted attempts to promote irrigation by 
granting millions of acres of public land on unrealistic terms. 
 
 74. MEAD, supra note 1, at 290-91 (discussing Nebraska). 
 75. Id. at 145–59 (describing quantifiability problems in Colorado). 
 76. Id., at 63. 
 77. Id. at 144. 
 78. JAMES EARL SHEROW, WATERING THE VALLEY: DEVELOPMENT ALONG THE HIGH PLAINS 
ARKANSAS RIVER, 1870–1950, at 79–92 (1991). Irrigation districts in western Kansas and Nebraska also 
enjoyed substantial legal privileges. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 27, 1866, ch. 57, 1866 Kan. Sess. Laws 124–
38; Act of Mar. 6, 1923, ch. 144, 1923 Kan. Sess. Laws 205; Act of Feb. 19, 1877, 1877 Neb. Laws 168 
(classifying canals as internal improvements and granting irrigation corporations the power to condemn 
rights of way). 
 79. See Erasmus Haworth, Underground Waters of Southwestern Kansas, in WATER SUPPLY AND 
IRRIGATION PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY NO. 6, at 62–63 (1897). 
 80. See supra text accompanying notes 53–56 and 65–66. 
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The first tranche of federal disposition acts did not concern water directly. 
The Preemption Act81 and the Homestead Act82 provided for land patents to settlers 
from the United States, while railroad disposition acts used railroad companies as 
intermediaries.83 Irrigation was not a necessary condition for patents under these 
acts; but land so obtained did enable homesteaders to secure water rights under 
state law. Given aridity and federal incentives such as the Timber Culture Act 
(1873), these federal acts indirectly promoted appropriation claims by increasing 
the demand for water across the West.84 
The second tranche placed irrigation at the center of federal disposition. 
The Desert Land Act (1877) granted right of entry on condition of three years of 
irrigation, but invited fraud by not requiring proof of actual cultivation.85 It set 
arbitrary boundaries, enabling claimants to secure state law-based appropriation 
rights in some states but not others.86 And it granted far too much land—640 acres 
on top of the other claims available to the homesteader.87 This was far more land 
than any settler could cultivate, much less irrigate. Speculation soon displaced 
settlement, and fraud and failure delivered most holdings into the portfolios of 
corporations. Ninety-five percent of the final proofs of irrigation and settlement 
under the Desert Land Act were fraudulent.88 
 
 81. Preemption Act of 1841, ch. 16; 5 Stat. 453 (1841) repealed by Land Revision Act of 1891, ch. 
561, 26 Stat. 1095. 
 82. Homestead Act of May 20, 1862, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161–164, repealed by Act of Oct. 21, 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2787. 
 83. See, e.g., WILLIS DRUMMOND, JR., Land Grants in Aid of Internal Improvements, in THE ARID 
LANDS, supra note 10, at 178–95. In Kansas, grants to railroads amounted to more than eight million 
acres, roughly halved between direct federal grants to the railroads and federal grants to Kansas for 
subsequent transfer to the railroads—nearly one-sixth the area of the state as a whole. HOMER E. 
SOCOLOFSKY & HUBER SELF, HISTORICAL ATLAS OF KANSAS 31 (2d. ed. 1988). 
 84. The Timber Culture Act of 1873, Pub. L. No. 42-277, 17 Stat. 605c, sought to humidify the 
Great Plains by allowing settlers to obtain 160 additional acres on the condition that they plant trees on 
at least 40 of them. It was sponsored by Senator Phineas W. Hitchcock of Nebraska, and predicated on 
the belief that “as civilization extends westward, the fall of rain increases from year to year.” See Robert 
Manley, Land and Water in 19th Century Nebraska, in FLAT WATER: A HISTORY OF NEBRASKA AND 
ITS WATER 17 (Charles A. Flowerday ed. 1993) (quoting Samuel Aughey, a professor of natural 
sciences at the University of Nebraska in 1873, and “Nebraska’s foremost scientific promoter”). 
 85. Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377; see also 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2012). The act still defines 
“desert land” as “all lands exclusive of timber lands and mineral lands which will not, without irrigation, 
produce some agricultural crop,” a fact ascertained either by the sworn testimony of two credible 
witnesses or the secretary of the interior or his designee. See 43 U.S.C. § 322 (2012). The vague and 
ambiguous language made fraud inevitable and has been repeatedly ridiculed by all commentators. 
 86. See Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377; see also 43 U.S.C. § 322. While Colorado fell 
within the Desert Land Act’s scope in 1891, Kansas and Nebraska never did, even though the western 
regions of these two states have basically the same climate as eastern Colorado. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 
ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095, 1097. 
 87. After 1877, a patentee could use the Preemption, Homestead, Timber Culture, and Desert Land 
Acts to obtain 1,120 acres—nearly two sections, more than half of that allegedly irrigated. Chastened, 
Congress restricted the Desert Land Act to 320 acres and repealed the Preemption and Timber Culture 
Acts. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095, 1097. 
 88. MEAD, supra note 1, at 17; MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS 
DISAPPEARING WATER 44 (New York: Penguin Books rev. ed. 1993). 
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The Carey Act (1894) sought to reform these flaws. It made between one 
and three million acres of federal land available to the western states on the 
condition that the receiving state, whether directly or through private companies,  
develop irrigation canals and works; the state would then sell off the irrigated land 
in quarter sections.89 Unfortunately, it adopted the same arbitrary, state-line 
boundaries as its infamous predecessor, the Desert Land Act, and likewise had no 
provisions for constructing irrigation works in western states with less unclaimed 
public land.90 The act sought to reduce speculation by requiring that water rights be 
attached to the irrigated land, and it promoted better irrigation projects by requiring 
the state to supervise their design and construction.91 These improvements had 
limited success in Wyoming, Idaho, and Utah, but most projects failed because the 
Carey Act’s reforming initiatives—especially its virtue of appurtenance—were too 
costly.92 Irrigators faced mortgages that combined their land purchases with the 
high costs of developing the irrigation project, and few could make their 
payments.93 
By 1900, most of the West’s land had been claimed—and thanks to the 
laws of western water and federal disposition, more than ten times its water 
supply.94 The federal disposition acts were predicated on a largely Jeffersonian, and 
therefore a largely Lockean, vision of the pioneers as yeoman farmers, creating 
society out of the desert wilderness through their individual industry, civic virtue, 
and pluck.95 But individual initiative was almost never enough to produce viable 
irrigation. As Mead described the Desert Land Act, “[i]f there was an independent 
water supply for each 320 acres, or if every man’s canal could begin and end on his 
own land, then this law would be an admirable institution;” but no such situation 
existed.96 Corporate initiatives could and did work. They worked in the Mormon 
colonies on the Wasatch Front in Utah, in the utopian cooperatives and irrigation 
colonies along the Cache la Poudre in Colorado, and in irrigation projects without 
 
 89. See Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 372, 422; see also 43 U.S.C. §§ 641–48 (2012). 
 90. The Carey Act excluded Kansas and Nebraska, but included Colorado. See 43 U.S.C. § 645 
(2012). Colorado was allowed up to two million acres, including the treaty lands formerly held by the 
Uncompahgre and White River Utes. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 645, 647; see also Act of Aug. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 
38-39; Act of Feb. 24, 1909, ch. 178, 35 Stat. 644; Act of Mar. 1, 1907, ch. 2922, 34 Stat. 1056. Nevada 
was allowed two million acres. See 43 U.S.C. § 645; Act of Mar. 4, 1911, ch. 285, 36 Stat. 1417. 
Wyoming was also allowed up to two million acres. See 43 U.S.C. § 645; Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 200, 
35 Stat. 347. Idaho was allowed up to three million acres. See 43 U.S.C. § 645; Act of May 25, 1908, 35 
Stat. 577 (1908); Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 200, 35 Stat. 347. Arizona and New Mexico became eligible 
for Carey Act grants in 1909. See 43 U.S.C. § 646; Act of Feb. 18, 1909, ch. 150, 35 Stat. 638. 
 91. 43 U.S.C. § 641. 
 92. MEAD, supra note 1, at 24–27. Mead’s optimistic view of Carey Act projects in Wyoming was 
based on his appreciation for the state’s administrative regulations for water in general, which he largely 
authored. Id. at 247–74. 
 93. Id. at 345. Corruption was almost certainly a factor in this distress. See Transcript of Remarks 
of Spencer L. Baird, Attorney for the Bureau of Reclamation, at Conference of the Governor’s 
Committee on the Appropriation of Water in Kansas, Topeka, October 16–17, at 6 (1944) (on file with 
the author). 
 94. MEAD, supra note 1, at 145–59 (regarding Colorado). 
 95. SCHORR, supra note 72, at 156–57. 
 96. MEAD, supra note 1, at 22. 
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such utopian ends.97 They worked in the handful of projects that succeeded under 
the Carey Act. Yet on the whole, the success of these enterprises owed little to 
federal acts of disposition. 
Despite federal support, large-scale irrigation across the Great Plains faced 
three difficult obstacles. The first concerned the legal structure of ownership: land 
titles derived from the federal government, but water rights came from the states. 
The result was a split estate, where one party, often an irrigation company, held the 
water rights under state law, while another party, usually the homesteader or an 
assignee, obtained the federal land patent.98 In contrast to those who promoted the 
severability of a water right from its appurtenant land, Powell and Mead stressed 
that split estates had promoted water monopolies and other speculative abuses, and 
that successful irrigation required combining land titles with water rights.99 
But overcoming this obstacle produced a second one: private irrigation 
companies usually lacked the engineering and financial resources to build effective 
irrigation projects, even under the Carey Act.100 Successful projects needed experts 
to design and build them on a large and efficient scale, and they required financing 
on a scale that could insulate irrigators from speculative pressures to sever their 
water rights.101 
The final obstacle was the doctrine of prior appropriation itself. It had 
produced vague, mistaken, and grossly excessive claims to water, far more than 
western streams could provide even in wet years.102 Because many reservoirs had 
storage water rights that were junior to most of the irrigation rights on a steam, 
prior appropriation made it difficult to store water in dry years, when it was most 
needed and valuable.103 Lawyers and litigation discredited the doctrine’s founding 
justifications—that it established clear and quickly enforceable property rights, and 
that it was well suited to manage western waters for orderly irrigation.104 Yet by 
1900, the doctrine was deeply anchored in state law, and millions of acres of 
irrigated land relied upon it. 
Driven by the belief that only federal supervision could resolve these 
obstacles, Congress responded with the Reclamation Act of 1902.105 It made the 
federal government, through the newly created Reclamation Service, the creditor, 
designer, and builder of large-scale irrigation projects. Federal financing came from 
a fund generated by the sale of public lands. The act directed the Secretary of the 
Interior to survey, locate, and build irrigation projects and then open these 
 
 97. Powell, supra note 10, at 21. Mead stressed that the success of private irrigation projects in 
Colorado and Utah was largely due to the favorable conditions of the Front Range and the Wasatch 
Front respectively, which enabled irrigators to build small-scale projects at low cost. MEAD, supra note 
1, at 63. 
 98. The potential conflict between federal and state law worried Mead as much as the split estate 
itself. MEAD, supra note 1, at 62. 
 99. Id. at 22–23; Powell, supra note 10, at 53–55. 
 100. SHEROW, supra note 78, at 79–92; MEAD, supra note 1, at 310 (regarding Idaho). 
 101. MEAD, supra note 1, at 19, 27. See also infra text accompanying note 107. 
 102. Id. at 145–59 (regarding Colorado). 
 103. Id, at 169–71. 
 104. Id. at 299, 307. 
 105. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in part at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 
(2006)). 
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improved public lands to settlement under the homestead laws. Resident farmers 
would irrigate small tracts whose water supply was ensured by federal projects; 
they would then repay the government for its investment at heavily subsidized 
rates. Through this structure (which was also applied to private, already-settled 
lands), Reclamation’s finance and design would resolve the problems of 
undercapitalized and poorly designed projects. As for the speculative dangers of 
severable water rights, the split estate, and prior appropriation, the act required 
water rights for Reclamation projects to be fused with land and explicitly devoted 
to irrigation.106 Supreme in finance, expertise, and law, Reclamation would 
establish and protect irrigation communities across the West.107 
That was the plan, at least; but Reclamation’s technocratic and federal 
formula generated immediate opposition from western states. As both the 
governance limitations and the water-management shortfalls of local and state-
based systems had become apparent during the 1890s, irrigation experts had 
divided into two general camps. The first camp consisted of what might be called 
irrigation federalists, who generally championed Reclamation: Powell, Mead, and 
Frederick Newell, the first chief of the Reclamation Service (renamed the Bureau 
of Reclamation in 1923). Their advocacy for interstate, basin-based irrigation 
projects undergirded bold federal claims both to unappropriated water supplies and 
of federal jurisdiction during the first decades of the twentieth century. To protect 
unappropriated water supplies for subsequent downstream use, the Department of 
Interior (Interior) imposed embargoes against Colorado on the Upper Rio Grande, 
against Wyoming on the North Platte River, and against Arizona on the Salt River, 
preventing upstream water appropriations on the public domain.108 The second 
camp, led by anti-federalists such as Delph Carpenter, understandably viewed these 
federal water claims as invasions of the western states’ sovereign right to control 
their water supplies.109 
The conflict between federalists and anti-federalists played a critical role 
during the seminal period of interstate water litigation between 1902 and 1945.110 
 
 106. Id. § 8 (codified in part at 43 U.S.C. § 372 (2006)). In this regard, the Reclamation Act follows 
the Carey Act, which also requires appurtenance: see supra text accompanying note 91. 
 107. Between politics and the realities of financing reclamation projects, the act has been regularly 
and significantly amended. The standard legal discussion of the Reclamation Act is Amy K. Kelley & 
Reed D. Benson, Federal Reclamation Law, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 41 (Amy K. Kelley 
ed., 3d ed. 2015). See also Joseph Sax, Selling Reclamation Water Rights: A Case Study in Federal 
Subsidy Policy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 13 (1965); Kelley, supra note 30; LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, FROM 
RECLAMATION TO SUSTAINABILITY: WATER, AGRICULTURE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE 
AMERICAN WEST (1999); Benson, supra note 30. 
 108. DOUGLAS R. LITTLEFIELD, CONFLICT ON THE RIO GRANDE: WATER AND THE LAW, 1879–1939, 
at 170–74, 183–87 (2008); see also Donald J. Pisani, State vs. Nation: Federal Reclamation and Water 
Rights in the Progressive Era, in WATER, LAND AND LAW IN THE WEST: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC 
POLICY, 1850–1920, at 38–49 (1996). 
 109. See DANIEL TYLER, SILVER FOX OF THE ROCKIES: DELPHUS E. CARPENTER AND WESTERN 
WATER COMPACTS 4–9, 75–76 (2003). 
 110. Relevant cases decided in this period include: Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) 
(representing a decision in litigation that lasted from 1902 through 1907); Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 
383 (1943); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (representing litigation that lasted from 1911 
through 1940); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Nebraska 
v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 
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Indeed, while most of these suits were formally cast as conflicts between states, the 
conflict over the federal government’s role in interstate water management figured 
prominently. Consistent with Interior’s embargoes, Reclamation asserted the legal 
right to all unappropriated water in the Arkansas River Basin during Kansas v. 
Colorado (1902–1907),111 and made the same claim on the North Platte River 
Basin as late as 1945, in Nebraska v. Wyoming.112 Understandably alarmed, 
Colorado asserted sovereign ownership over all of the waters originating in the 
state during the same period; moreover, it claimed, all of the waters of the Arkansas 
River had been claimed by Colorado appropriators, leaving none for Kansas.113 
Colorado made similar claims in Wyoming v. Colorado.114 Kansas made its own 
uncompromising claim upon a different doctrinal basis: its riparian doctrine entitled 
it to the full flows of the Arkansas River.115 
The decisions in these cases made clear the Court’s powers to apportion 
interstate rivers, but they produced uneven results. The Court’s 1907 assertion of its 
powers to equitably apportion interstate rivers in Kansas v. Colorado did not 
actually produce an apportionment decree.116 (Nor did its subsequent decision 
regarding the Arkansas River in 1944.117) But the Court’s interstate application of 
the prior appropriation doctrine in Wyoming v. Colorado (1922) did produce a 
decree—to the great alarm of upper-basin states, especially in the Colorado River 
Basin.118 
To protect their waters from federal incursion by judicial apportionment 
and from claims based on prior appropriation and development by downstream 
states, western states negotiated early interstate compacts, most notably the 
Colorado River Compact (1922) and the La Plata River Compact (1925).119 The 
 
 111. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 56 (1907). 
 112. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 611–12 (1945). 
 113. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 57 (1907); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 457 (1922). 
For more on Colorado’s claims, see James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California’s 
Claims to Water from the Colorado River—Part I: The Law of the River, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 
290, 295 n.17 (2001); Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, 
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 114. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 457 (1922). 
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prior appropriation doctrine as early as 1876, recognized in Act of Mar. 15, 1876, ch. 58, 1876 Kan. 
Sess. Laws 153, a state court decision in 1905 complicated Kansas’s claim. See Clark v. Allaman, 80 P. 
571, 572–74 (1905) (noting the lack of understanding of the prior appropriation doctrine and declining 
the legislative suggestion to broaden it). 
 116. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 117–18. 
 117. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1944). 
 118. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). For a discussion of the context in which the 
Colorado River Compact was negotiated, see NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., WATER AND THE WEST: THE 
COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST (2d ed. 2009). 
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The text of the Colorado River Compact first occurs at 70 CONG. REC. 324–25 (1928). The Colorado 
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not become effective until 1929. See Boulder Canyon Project Act, 46 Stat. 3000 (1929). The first 
interstate compact to gain congressional consent was the La Plata River Compact between Colorado and 
New Mexico. See La Plata River Compact, ch. 110, 43 Stat. 796 (1925). 
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Court’s decision in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. (1938) 
clearly placed the states’ federal compact obligations over the claims of prior state 
appropriation rights, affirming the power of state engineers to administer those 
rights accordingly.120 Secured by the Court’s defense of the compact mechanism in 
Hinderlider, western states entered into numerous interstate water allocation 
compacts between 1939 and 1949.121 The Court soon stated its approval of that 
mechanism: in 1943, it invited Colorado and Kansas to negotiate their longstanding 
conflict over the Arkansas River “pursuant to the compact clause of the Federal 
constitution.”122 
The Court was less clear, however, on federal claims to unappropriated 
water supplies.123 The Court’s reticence raised few problems, largely because 
Reclamation did not have a substantial presence across the Great Plains for several 
decades, aside from the North Platte Project in Wyoming and Nebraska (1905). 
Indeed, the first three decades of the twentieth century seemed to make irrigation 
less critical as Great Plains agriculture entered its second manic phase—the “great 
plow up.” Steam- and gasoline-powered tractors, pulling deep plows and 
mechanized farm equipment, vastly and recklessly expanded cultivated acreage 
across the region. For a time, farming was both productive and profitable because 
of an anomalous combination of unusually wet and temperate weather, high 
wartime wheat prices, and the speculative excesses of the Roaring Twenties.124 
The Great Depression and the disasters of the “dirty thirties” destroyed 
that fragile anomaly, and brought Reclamation to the region as a whole. The “great 
plow up” had destabilized Great Plains soils, which blew away during the Dust 
Bowl era and buried farms during the Republican River flood of 1935.125 These 
disasters, together with the security afforded by interstate compacts after 
Hinderlider, motivated the states and Reclamation to plan a comprehensive system 
of multipurpose reservoirs to supply irrigation water and control flooding. Local 
boosters immediately embraced what Powell, Mead, and the Reclamation Act had 
recognized a generation earlier: only federal means and power could build such 
infrastructure. Unlike drainages such as the South Platte and the Rio Grande, where 
 
 120. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (holding that the 
Colorado State Engineer could administer adjudicated state-law appropriation rights predating the La 
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Compact, ch. 64, 58 Stat. 94 (1944) (between South Dakota and Wyoming); Upper Colorado River 
Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949) (among Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and 
Wyoming); Arkansas River Compact, ch. 155, 63 Stat. 145 (1949) (between Colorado and Kansas); and 
Pecos River Compact, ch. 184, 63 Stat. 159 (1949) (between New Mexico and Texas). 
 122. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943). 
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TIMOTHY EGAN, THE WORST HARD TIME: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THOSE WHO SURVIVED THE GREAT 
AMERICAN DUST BOWL (2006). 
 125. WORSTER, supra note 124, at 17. 
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numerous private irrigation ditches predated the Reclamation Act, most of the 
rivers of the Great Plains were relatively undeveloped. This fact encouraged 
planners to consider the region’s river basins as a whole, unimpeded by the 
complexities of extensive, preexisting irrigation projects and their water rights. 
This situation was ideal for Reclamation’s focus on river basin planning and 
accounting.126 
The legal resolution achieved by interstate compacts, together with the 
natural and man-made disasters of the Dust Bowl, produced a decade of 
cooperative federalism, with federal water projects and state water planning 
operating in tandem across the Great Plains. On the federal side, the most important 
piece of legislation was the 1944 Flood Control Act, which planned the 
development of the entire Missouri River Basin through a series of irrigation, 
flood-control, and navigation projects.127 On the state side, the 1940s produced the 
Republican River Compact of 1943 and the Arkansas River Compact of 1949. 
These compacts established federal guarantees that the states’ water allocations and 
Reclamation’s irrigation projects would be protected at the same time.128 
Secured by the Compact and enabled by the Flood Control Act, private 
irrigation districts expanded within the Basin, and Reclamation built new irrigation 
districts during the following decades. See Figure 1. These are classic works of 
civil engineering, built for irrigator-citizens who populate a recognizable 
community of private farms within a federal irrigation project. Within the Basin 
alone, federal money and expertise built nine dams and reservoirs and thousands of 
miles of canals and laterals to subsidize—often at substantial cost—complex 
irrigation and flood-control projects. The region had long been characterized by 
demographic and natural extremes that militate against an enduring public—the 
booms of original settlement and the “great plow up,” the depopulating droughts of 
the late 1880s and the Dust Bowl, and finally the flood of 1935.129 Given this 
tumultuous natural and demographic history, Reclamation’s projects promised a 
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Figure 1: Republican River Compact Area and Irrigation Districts 
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stability predicated upon this allocated, engineered, and regulated water supply.130 
Here and elsewhere, Reclamation projects also enhanced the water supplies of 
preexisting irrigation communities, by providing supplemental storage and delivery 
infrastructure. As a result, few surface-water irrigation communities across the 
Great Plains could claim they were separate or independent from the public beyond 
their boundaries—both the wider national public which largely financed their 
irrigation projects, and the cooperative federalism which had built them in the first 
place.131 
C. The Political Culture of Surface Water Irrigation Communities 
Compared to its projects farther west, such as those in the Colorado and 
Columbia River Basins, but especially in California, Reclamation’s projects across 
the Great Plains have received little attention, probably because they are not 
stupendous. Sited in wide and shallow valleys, these projects serve comparatively 
modest irrigation districts. This seems a mundane point, but given the conflicting 
and sometimes hyperbolic judgments that Reclamation has provoked, some 
earthiness might just be in order.132 Whether heroic or villainous, Reclamation built 
irrigation communities across the Great Plains that have enjoyed a mostly stable 
water supply for more than sixty years. For all of the political machinations that 
went into their construction, these irrigation communities have largely endured at a 
time when many rural communities are under significant pressure to survive. 
This is not a mundane point. Compared to groundwater irrigation 
communities across the Great Plains, surface-water irrigation communities have 
existed a fairly long time, and their present state carries the stamp of the social and 
civil engineering that made them possible. It is important, and fairly easy, not to 
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romanticize these communities. But it is equally important, and less easy, to 
recognize their distinct political culture, which has five principal characteristics. 
First, surface-water irrigation communities such as those across the Basin 
are still mostly recognizable as communities, clustered around their projects on a 
local and visible scale. Reclamation’s visionaries wanted to build nucleated 
communities composed of small holdings, irrigated and intensively farmed. As 
Mead put it, “Where farmers live in villages, they are able to realize a happy 
combination of town and country life, and to dwell under conditions which are 
favorable to a growth of the best forms of civilization.”133 While not even Floyd 
Dominy, the unrepentant, steamrolling commissioner of Reclamation during its 
high imperial phase, could plausibly describe these districts as full of happy 
villagers, they do remain largely populated by resident farmers.134 For most of the 
twentieth century, the Reclamation Act required the owners of irrigated lands to 
reside on those lands or nearby.135 They were also subject to the acreage limitations 
of the homestead laws, which set a floor of 40 and a ceiling of 160 acres.136 
The residency requirement and the acreage limitation sought to reverse the 
nineteenth-century trend of social dispersion, where settlers’ desire to obtain as 
much land as possible frustrated the formation of schools, churches, and social life. 
The United States Supreme Court repeatedly reaffirmed that goal, to ensure that the 
“enormous expenditure” for Reclamation projects “will not go in disproportionate 
share to a few individuals with large land holdings. Moreover, it [the Reclamation 
Act] prevents the use of the federal reclamation service for speculative 
purposes.”137 These rules lasted for eighty years, until the abolition of the residency 
requirement and significant relaxation of the acreage limitation in 1982.138 
Nonetheless, surface-water irrigation communities across the Great Plains largely 
remain residential, nucleated communities. 
The Kansas Bostwick Irrigation District (KBID) is a representative 
example. It supplies irrigation water to 244 owners of district lands, who farm 
nearly 43,000 acres in north-central Kansas—an average farm is 176 acres. The 
acreage limitations in the district applied until the Reclamation Reform Act of 
1982, and Reclamation enforced them, requiring owners to sell their excess land. 
The residency requirement also applied, as did Kansas laws forbidding the 
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corporate ownership of farmland; as a result, about half of the local residents still 
farm their own land or district land owned by other local residents, or they are 
retired from farming and live nearby.139 These numbers stand modestly in contrast 
to the gaudy corruptions of California, where corporate ownership of farmland and 
Reclamation’s neglect of its own laws have combined to distort the social vision of 
the Reclamation Act beyond all recognition.140 
Second, surface-water irrigation communities are organized along 
corporate lines, where a corporate entity mediates between the water supply of the 
district as a whole and the individual owners of irrigated land within the district. 
This corporate structure characterizes both private irrigation companies, such as 
those on the Arkansas River in Colorado and Kansas, and Reclamation districts, 
such as the Bostwick Irrigation District on the Republican River in Nebraska and 
Kansas. The ditch or the district, not the individual landowners, typically holds the 
water right under which lands for the entire district are irrigated.141 Districts make 
corporate decisions about system maintenance and the irrigation calendar. 
At the operational level, individual landowners make daily calls for water 
from the reservoir or main canal headgate during the irrigation season, and district 
managers and ditch riders respond to those calls, route water deliveries, and 
account for them. The operational realities of surface-water irrigation require a high 
degree of coordination to ensure that water is delivered efficiently and on a timely 
basis. This coordination takes place among individual irrigators within one district 
and among adjacent districts as well. The Associated Ditches of Kearny and Finney 
Counties in Kansas, which irrigate from the Arkansas River, provide a good 
example of coordination among legally distinct, but hydrologically connected, 
surface-water irrigation companies. For all of their internecine battles, they have 
operated under a series of consent decrees dating back to the nineteenth century, 
which include provisions for routing water through each other’s ditches.142 
Third, surface-water irrigation communities are intended to be permanent. 
They hold water rights that are real property rights. The high capital costs of 
building and maintaining surface-water irrigation projects could not be justified if 
their water supply was not dependable over time. That is especially the case with 
 
 139. E-mail from Kenneth Nelson, Superintendent, Kan. Bostwick Irrigation Dist., Courtland, 
Kansas, to author (Nov. 26, 2014) (on file with author). 
 140. For example, the Southern Pacific Railroad controlled more than 100,000 acres of the 
Westlands Water District in 1979, where less than three percent of all farms controlled 31 percent of the 
land. Kelley & Benson, supra note 107, at § 41.03(a) n.71. 
 141. For example, the Republican River Compact recognized the rights of the Pioneer Irrigation 
Ditch on the North Fork of the Republican River. That became necessary because the Pioneer Ditch 
diverted water within Colorado, but put it to beneficial use in Nebraska; the Compact recognized the 
decision in Weiland v. Pioneer Irrigation Co., 259 U.S. 498 (1922), granted to Colorado the exclusive 
power to regulate diversions from the ditch, and allocated to Nebraska the amount of those diversions. 
Republican River Compact, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86, 89 (1943); see also TYLER, supra note 109, at 105–
108. The priority date of KBID’s water right was formally recognized by the compacting states in 2002. 
See Final Settlement Stipulation, supra note 22, at 25–26; see also infra note 246. 
 142. See generally Arkansas River Surface Water Distribution Plan, KAN. DEP’T AGRIC., 
http://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/interstate-rivers-and-compacts/kansas-colorado-
arkansas-river-compact [https://perma.cc/9ZSM-XNTZ] (expand “Arkansas River Surface Water 
Distribution Plan” menu). 
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Reclamation projects, which stress their permanent irrigation and flood-control 
benefits to justify their substantial subsidies.143 Alongside that fiscal reality is the 
requirement that irrigated land be forever tied to its water rights, despite the efforts 
of speculators to sever them.144 While this requirement lapsed for private irrigation 
districts long ago, it remains valid for Reclamation projects.145 
Fourth, surface-water irrigation communities tend to be legally 
conservative. They support the fundamental principles of classic western water law, 
primarily because they hold senior water rights in their water neighborhoods. 
Likewise, they tend to oppose legal changes that may undermine their ability to 
exercise the priorities and other rights they enjoy. The entrance of Reclamation did 
not substantially alter this conservatism, because the Reclamation Act has 
consistently deferred to state water law. Indeed, Reclamation projects effectively 
made the federal government a guarantor of the districts’ water supply.146 
Finally, surface-water irrigation communities are under threat across the 
Great Plains because they have become vulnerable to both the hydrologic impact 
and the political power of groundwater irrigation. The reservoir inflows upon 
which they depend have gradually declined over the last several decades due to 
excessive groundwater pumping, despite the senior priority of their water rights. 
Moreover, groundwater irrigators have purchased and retired part or all of the 
water rights of many ditch companies and irrigation districts, while those that 
remain have been unevenly protected by state engineers.147 
II. GROUNDWATER IRRIGATION COMMUNITIES AND THEIR 
POLITICAL CULTURE 
A. The Groundwater Revolution 
Reclamation applied a progressive social vision to the ancient technology 
of surface-water irrigation. By contrast, groundwater irrigation communities owe 
their existence to modern technology—the high-capacity, centrifugal water pump, 
propelled by electricity or internal combustion, which can pump thousands of 
gallons per minute from the vast and previously unexploited aquifers of the West, 
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 147. See infra Parts III.B and III.C. 
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especially the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer.148 This technological breakthrough 
took place at the very time that Reclamation’s Great Plains projects were coming 
on line during the 1950s. 
At first, irrigating with groundwater required little more than a decent well 
and a powerful pump to flood the fields; later, center-pivot systems made irrigation 
more versatile, precise, and efficient. The impact of the pump and pivot can hardly 
be overstated.149 More than the tractors of the “great plow up,” groundwater 
irrigation sharply reduced the need for farm labor. Where one industrious farm 
worker could surface-irrigate little more than 200 acres by opening ditches with a 
shovel or using siphon tubes and gated pipe, an equally industrious farmer 
operating an early center pivot could water a full section—640 acres.150 
Center pivots also vastly expanded the reach of irrigated agriculture across 
the Great Plains. Compared to gravity-fed, flood-irrigation systems, center pivots 
can distribute water more evenly and much more precisely, applying water as well 
as fertilizer according to the specific needs of the crop and the moisture content of 
the soil. They are also more efficient, delivering a higher percentage of water to the 
root zone of the crop: where flood irrigation systems are at best 65 to 70 percent 
efficient, modern center pivots with drop nozzles and draglines raise that level to 
90 percent. Groundwater irrigators have exploited this increase to expand irrigated 
acreage and intensify crop density, raising yields. 
Center pivots also conquer gravity: their motorized wheels can crawl over 
sloping and uneven uplands, enabling the irrigation of millions of acres of 
previously unirrigable land. And the finely modulated spray of their nozzles allows 
effective irrigation of both coarse and sandy soils without washing them away. As a 
consequence, lands formerly considered unfit for farming, such as those above the 
southern banks of the Arkansas River in southwestern Kansas, now yield more than 
three hundred bushels of corn per acre. 
For all of these reasons, modern groundwater irrigation has transformed 
much of the Great Plains from risky dryland farms and spotty shortgrass rangelands 
into a large portion of the most dependably profitable irrigated land in North 
America. Only a Luddite would fail to appreciate this transformation. Groundwater 
irrigators on the Great Plains are among the most technologically adept farmers in 
the world. Across the Ogallala, irrigators can monitor their fields and control their 
center-pivot irrigation systems remotely through their smartphones.151 
The technology of groundwater irrigation, together with the huge volumes 
of the Ogallala Aquifer, enabled anyone who owned land above it to irrigate. 
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Between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, everyone appeared to have enough 
groundwater, which is protected and in many places immune from annual 
variations in precipitation. Up to a point, groundwater irrigators could compensate 
for drought by pumping more. As a result, groundwater irrigation has enabled the 
overexploitation of water resources in a way that is not possible with surface water. 
B. The Legal Response to the Groundwater Revolution 
Because groundwater behaves differently than surface water, the 
groundwater revolution created fundamental challenges to western water codes. 
Unlike the annual fluctuations of streams and rivers, which vary according to 
precipitation, aquifers fluctuate far less, and the effects of pumping-induced 
depletions to groundwater can lag behind the pumping itself for decades. The 
Ogallala Aquifer, which is mostly unconnected to the streams and rivers of the 
Great Plains, is only affected by pumping; its waters are thousands of years old and 
effectively unreplenishable.152 Mostly unaware and relatively unconcerned with 
these groundwater sources, the architects of western water law did not foresee 
whether the water could be tapped out. After all, the right to use water assumes that 
there is water to use.153 
Across the states of the Republican River Basin, the groundwater 
revolution and the unique features of the Ogallala Aquifer produced basic changes 
in western water law and policy. The sheer size and drought-proof dependability of 
the aquifer encouraged irrigators, regulators, and policy makers to ignore the 
inevitable reckoning inherent in the prior appropriation doctrine. Starting in the 
1950s, state legislatures amended their water codes to encourage the development 
of groundwater without setting a limit on the depletion of the aquifer. The 
opportunity to exploit the Ogallala Aquifer was too good to pass up, and the 
problems of depletion could be put off until later. Some states withdrew Great 
Plains groundwater sources from the public domain and placed them under local 
control, creating a new type of water-based public in the process. 
These changes raised a fundamental question: was groundwater a public 
resource? In Colorado, the answer seemed to be yes, and to rest on constitutional 
bedrock. The waters of any “natural stream” and the “waters of the state” were 
public resources subject to prior appropriation; hence, it seemed reasonable to 
conclude that groundwater sources were “waters of the state.”154 The groundwater 
revolution, however, produced legislation that redefined those waters. In 1969, the 
Colorado Legislature defined the constitutional meaning of “waters of the state” to 
include groundwater supplies that were tributary to natural streams, but to exclude 
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 154. See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6 (1876); Act of Feb, 19, 1879, 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 94-
108; Safranek v. Limon, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951). 
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other types of groundwater.155 Tributary groundwater would be governed by prior 
appropriation and receive the same protection as surface-water rights.156 
The other major type of groundwater was labeled “designated 
groundwater”—groundwater that did not underlie a flowing stream, such as the 
aquifers of eastern Colorado, where pumping did not quickly affect surface water 
and water rights.157 Because strict application of the prior appropriation doctrine 
would frustrate the development of these groundwater supplies, Colorado limited 
the doctrine: senior water rights would be entitled to “reasonable groundwater 
pumping levels” but not to the “maintenance of historical water levels.”158 
Economic development came at the policy price of withdrawing a substantial 
portion of Great Plains groundwater from the public sphere, and compromising the 
doctrine of prior appropriation.159 
From a different origin, Kansas arrived at a similar decision. Kansas 
originally followed two legal water doctrines. Eastern Kansas adhered to the 
riparian doctrine, where the reasonable use of water was an attribute of riparian 
property.160 Higher, drier, western Kansas followed the prior appropriation 
doctrine.161 These doctrines coexisted with increasing unease until 1943–1944, 
when Kansas water law suffered two major blows. In the second iteration of the 
interstate conflict between Colorado and Kansas over the Arkansas River, the 
Supreme Court in 1943 again declined to apportion the river.162 The Court’s final 
rationale for not effecting an apportionment in that case was that Kansas’s 
bifurcated legal system prevented Kansas from making the necessary showing 
“with respect to the right of non-riparian owners to appropriate waters against 
objection by other such owners.”163 One year later, the Kansas Supreme Court 
ruled that Kansas water law did not grant the state the power to regulate 
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groundwater.164 By 1944, it was clear that Kansas water law could neither fully 
quantify the state’s total water rights, nor protect owners of individual surface 
water rights against impairment caused by groundwater pumping. 
These two decisions prompted a comprehensive review of Kansas water 
law, which focused largely on these two issues: the problem of Kansas’s bifurcated 
water law, which made it difficult to quantify available water supplies; and whether 
groundwater was a public resource subject to appropriation and regulation under 
the jurisdiction of the chief engineer.165 Kansas resolved both issues decisively in 
1945 by enacting the Kansas Water Appropriation Act (KWAA).166 The KWAA 
dedicated all of the waters of Kansas, including groundwater, to the people of the 
state, subject to prior appropriation as enforced by the chief engineer.167 A central 
tenet of the KWAA is a basic rule of prior appropriation: if a junior water right 
impaired a senior right by affecting its access to or use of water, the chief engineer 
had the statutory duty to administer, or curtail, the use made under the junior 
right.168 
The groundwater revolution soon forced this basic and decisive rule to 
yield to a compromise. Like their neighbors in Colorado, Kansas policy makers 
recognized that the widespread pumping of Ogallala groundwater would soon 
impair senior rights by lowering the water table, giving the holders of those rights 
the power to invoke their priority, thus requiring the chief engineer to shut off 
junior rights and prohibit further groundwater development.169 The economic 
potential of the Ogallala Aquifer demanded that prior appropriation be 
compromised, and so the Kansas Legislature redefined impairment accordingly. In 
1957, the hard hydrological definition of impairment gave way to a softer 
economic one: applications for junior rights could henceforth be granted even if the 
use of those junior rights reduced groundwater levels, so long as the reduction did 
not go “beyond a reasonable economic limit.”170 Yet in the same session, the 
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legislature also boosted the legal status of a water right, defining it explicitly as a 
real property right.171 
These amendments, together with a liberal policy of granting water rights 
applications, resulted in a massive—but fully legal—overappropriation of Ogallala 
groundwater in Kansas.172 People did not seem to mind. Even Kansas chief 
engineer Guy Gibson believed that “water rights were like belly buttons: everyone 
ought to have one.”173 Groundwater levels across the Great Plains of Kansas began 
to decline as a consequence, creating something of a paradox: groundwater 
pumpers gained the legal right to permanently diminish the Ogallala, even as that 
property right explicitly attained the legal status of permanence. 
As for Nebraska, groundwater had never been considered a statewide 
public resource, so fewer adjustments were necessary to accommodate the 
groundwater revolution. Although it enshrined prior appropriation in its state 
constitution, Nebraska never extended that doctrine to groundwater, which it 
regulated instead by the doctrine of reasonable use.174 Alongside this legal and 
doctrinal distinction between surface water and groundwater was a jurisdictional 
one: Nebraska has always maintained that local governments should exclusively 
regulate groundwater supplies.175 
The legal and jurisdictional gap between surface water and groundwater in 
Nebraska is intentional and longstanding. As John Riddell, a Nebraska assistant 
attorney general, told his Kansas colleagues in 1944, “As to ground water, 
practically speaking, we do not have any law. There is no question but what in the 
future something will have to be done about that, probably the sooner the better.”176 
Later statutes have clearly stated that groundwater is connected to surface water, 
but the Nebraska Supreme Court has consistently refused to protect the holders of 
senior surface water rights from impairment by groundwater pumpers according to 
the priority doctrine.177 
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C. Local Publics and the Creed of Local Control 
The second change wrought by the groundwater revolution was political. 
If groundwater was not a statewide public resource, who should exercise 
jurisdiction over it? State legislatures answered this question largely by delegating 
jurisdiction to local districts or by enhancing the powers of existing ones. In so 
doing, they created a new type of water-related public, one that placed the local 
economic benefits of groundwater irrigation above concerns about the 
sustainability of supplies. Where Reclamation had stressed basin-wide planning 
and federal involvement, local control became the creed of groundwater irrigators 
across the Great Plains. 
Colorado has delegated the control of designated groundwater to local 
irrigators. While a state agency, the Colorado Ground Water Commission, issues 
well permits, it is dominated by “resident agriculturists” who live in the designated 
basins.178 The power really rests in local groundwater-management districts, which 
can “exercise all regulatory and administrative authority” over irrigation wells.179 
And in the event that a well owner places a priority call against others in his water-
rights neighborhood, neither the commission nor the state engineer can administer 
those rights; instead, the Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that the local 
groundwater-management district must do the job.180 The implication of this 
decision is clear: when enforcing priorities—typically the job of the state 
engineer—is most at issue, local control is exclusive. That is in marked contrast to 
the long-established system for surface-water and tributary groundwater, which 
makes no local compromises.181 
Despite its central state control over groundwater, Kansas also created 
local groundwater districts. After a false start in 1968, Kansas enacted the 
Groundwater Management District Act in 1972.182 This legislation sought to 
establish some local control over regulating and developing groundwater rights by 
forming local groundwater-management districts, or GMDs.183 Five GMDs were 
formed in western Kansas, overlying the state’s Ogallala supplies. They can assess 
taxes on their membership, which is limited to landowners and holders of 
groundwater rights.184 
Allied with farm and agribusiness interests that support groundwater 
pumping at its current levels, Kansas GMDs have become a powerful force in state 
water politics, one that the chief engineer must reckon with on a regular basis.185 In 
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partnership with the chief engineer, they have established well-spacing rules and 
closed large areas to new water rights, largely to protect current levels of 
groundwater pumping under existing water rights. However, the problem of over-
appropriation remains, while the regional impairment of wells is getting worse.186 
In response to these concerns, local GMDs led a successful effort to 
amend the GMD Act in 1978 to allow for intensive groundwater-use control areas, 
or IGUCAs. This amendment was intended to enable local irrigators to take the 
lead in reducing groundwater depletion by convincing the chief engineer to reduce 
pumping, even to sustainable levels, and even if these cutbacks conflicted with 
prior appropriation by reducing senior as well as junior rights.187 Across western 
Kansas, GMDs and the chief engineer have established eight IGUCAs, reducing 
water rights to restore balance to closely connected surface-water and groundwater 
supplies. But above the mostly nonrenewable supplies of the Ogallala farther west, 
the tool has proven to be too powerful to use. Neither the GMDs nor the chief 
engineer have sought to establish any IGUCAs in these areas, where the hardest 
depletion problems exist.188 
The absence of an IGUCA over the nonrenewable supplies of the Ogallala 
Aquifer reveals the irony of local control in Kansas. The GMD Act gave local 
districts substantial power to reduce groundwater depletion, but by choosing not to 
exercise that power, the GMDs have effectively returned it to the chief engineer, 
whose power and duties regarding an IGUCA arouse suspicion from local 
irrigators. If the chief engineer began proceedings to establish an IGUCA over the 
Ogallala Aquifer on his own, the GMDs would almost certainly oppose him. 
Because Nebraska has never claimed central authority over regulating 
groundwater, the state has never needed to delegate that authority; local control of 
groundwater has always been the law. While the Nebraska Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) controls surface water and water rights, groundwater is governed 
by a different set of laws, which are administered by natural resource districts 
(NRDs), which are large, multi-county state subdivisions.189 As Nebraska law 
states, “Local entities are the preferred regulators of activities which may 
contribute to ground water depletion.”190 The growth in groundwater irrigation in 
 
the most important decisions of the chief engineer, a classified employee under Kansas civil-service 
laws, are subject to review by the secretary of agriculture, a political appointee. Id. § 82a-1901(a) 
(2015). 
 186. See Michael K. Ramsey, Kansas Groundwater Management Districts: A Lawyer’s Perspective, 
15 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 522 (2006). 
 187. See Act of Apr. 14, 1978, ch. 437, §§ 2, 4, 1978 Kan. Sess. Laws 1713, 1715–16 (codified as 
amended at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1036, -1038 (2015)); see also Leland E. Rolfs, Comparing and 
Contrasting the Roles of the Division of Water Resources and the Groundwater Management Districts 
in Groundwater Management and Regulation, 15 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 505, 505–09 (2006). 
 188. For a summary of Kansas IGUCAs, see Intensive Groundwater Use Control Areas (IGUCAs), 
KAN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/managing-kansas-water-
resources/intensive-groundwater-use-control-areas [https://perma.cc/8NFN-S9AM]. 
 189. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 61-206(1) (2009): “The Department of Natural Resources is given 
jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to water rights for irrigation, power, or other useful purposes 
except as such jurisdiction is specifically limited by statute.” For the NRDs, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-
3213(1) (2007). 
 190. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-702 (2011). 
34 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 57 
Nebraska has brought a commensurate increase in the power of the NRDs. Each 
NRD has its own taxing authority and grants, administers, and regulates 
groundwater permits. State involvement in groundwater regulation depends on 
local NRD approval of state policies through local rules and regulations.191 As a 
result, the managers of the local NRDs collectively exert much more power over 
irrigation than does the DNR. 
D. The Political Culture of Groundwater Irrigation Communities 
Groundwater irrigation appeals to farmers because it enables them to 
access water without expensive dams and canals and without federal intervention 
and regulation.192 Across the Great Plains, the groundwater revolution produced 
irrigation communities that are markedly distinct from their surface-water 
counterparts. Regardless of the different state water codes under which they 
operate, these communities have secured substantial local control over 
groundwater. They have generated a distinct political culture that is inextricable 
from groundwater itself. That culture has five principal characteristics. 
The first and most important characteristic is their economic dominance. 
For example, since 1970, the amount of surface-water-irrigated acreage in 
Nebraska has remained relatively constant at roughly 1 million acres; by contrast, 
groundwater irrigation in the state expanded from about 500,000 acres in 1950 to 7 
million in 1990.193 Because irrigated agriculture is far more productive than 
dryland farming, it yields greater secondary economic benefits. The expansion in 
groundwater-irrigated acreage has generated economic growth in industries which 
supply irrigators with capital, insurance, irrigation-related farm machinery, seed, 
chemicals, and power for the pumps. Most of these suppliers have an economic 
interest in continuing groundwater irrigation at maximum levels, even if it reduces 
the long-term water supply beneath the irrigators’ land. 
Second, groundwater irrigation communities are more dispersed than 
surface-water ones. Where a surface-water community is necessarily organized 
around the structures of the irrigation project and its limitations, groundwater 
communities have no such constraints. There is no common water storage or 
delivery system, so groundwater irrigation communities lack the corporate structure 
and operation of their surface-water counterparts. Most farmers in surface-water 
irrigation communities receive the same allotment of water per acre as their 
neighbors. By contrast, groundwater supplies on the Great Plains are highly 
variable. Some irrigators in southwestern Kansas have enough groundwater to 
enable them to pump eighteen inches of water per acre every year for a hundred 
years, while others nearby may be struggling to irrigate fully now and may be out 
of water in ten years.194 
So groundwater irrigation communities are not as physically recognizable 
as surface-water ones. They are communities of atomized individual irrigators: 
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while their farms may lack a common physical connection to the water supply, they 
share a common orientation to the regulatory structures that control that supply. 
Groundwater irrigation communities are thus more abstract than surface-water 
ones, but they are no less real; indeed, they are ably represented by their 
groundwater districts. 
Third, groundwater irrigation communities are comparatively 
impermanent and mobile. Surface-water power and irrigation projects, especially 
Reclamation projects, are capital-intensive and designed to be permanent—to 
“endure as long as time endures.”195 While the investment required for groundwater 
irrigation is substantial, it is relatively inexpensive compared to surface-water 
irrigation, and the equipment is depreciable as a capital expense. If conditions 
change, the irrigator can move that equipment to another tract or sell the 
equipment. Major groundwater irrigators such as dairies and feedlots have moved 
during the last several decades in response to changes in groundwater levels and 
regulations.196 
Yet groundwater irrigation communities are also strongly marked by a 
fourth characteristic—their close connection to their local economies and markets. 
In Kansas at least, the power of these local economies and markets helps explain 
their communities’ quiescent approach to prior appropriation. Senior water-rights 
holders can protect themselves by requesting that the chief engineer administer 
junior water rights, but groundwater irrigation communities in Kansas have not 
behaved according to the administrative assumptions of prior appropriation. As 
individuals, farmers with senior groundwater rights have generally refrained from 
making calls to protect their wells against impairment by nearby junior wells.197 As 
communities, they have long pursued a deliberate policy of inaction to avoid the 
consequences of reducing junior groundwater rights. 
This action may seem economically irrational over the long term, but there 
are good reasons for it. It can be much more complicated to identify well-to-well 
impairment in a groundwater-dominated system than in a surface-water one.198 
Regarding new applications for groundwater rights or changes to existing ones, is 
the impairment beyond a reasonable economic limit?199 Answering this question 
requires time and analysis. The administration of prior appropriation rights in a 
surface-water system has immediate and predictable consequences; but in a 
groundwater system, especially one such as the Ogallala Aquifer, the effects of 
administration are delayed and uncertain, and can be too wide-ranging and 
draconian for many groundwater irrigators to consider. Making a groundwater call 
can also have greater impact than making a surface-water one: largely because the 
water-rights neighborhoods across the Ogallala Aquifer are severely over-
appropriated, protecting a senior groundwater right at its fully authorized quantity 
may require many nearby junior rights to be shut down for a long time. 
Groundwater irrigation communities in Kansas are acutely aware of this potential 
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consequence, and so few major irrigators have filed impairment complaints with 
the chief engineer; even fewer have taken their neighbors to court.200 
This collective and deliberate inaction is a tribute of sorts to groundwater 
irrigation communities, but it also reveals the way their individually held water 
rights relate to their local economic situation. A typical groundwater irrigator in 
Kansas grows corn, soybeans, and grain sorghum and sells those crops to feedlots 
and ethanol plants, which usually have substantial water rights of their own. Any 
administrative or legal action that might recalibrate local groundwater rights 
according to the actual (and declining) water supply threatens to upset this 
economic system, treating its participants disproportionately according to the 
priority of their water rights.201 
This inaction also reveals the final characteristic of groundwater irrigation 
communities: their wary attitude to classic western water law and regulation. 
Surface-water irrigation communities tend to be legally conservative because their 
senior water rights enjoy strong property-rights protections under state water law 
and—where applicable—the Reclamation Act. Groundwater irrigation 
communities do not generally enjoy this protection. And because administering 
groundwater rights according to the prior appropriation doctrine may produce 
unpredictable results, groundwater irrigation communities usually view water law 
not as something that protects property rights, but rather as governmental 
regulation that limits and interferes with their water use. Acting through their 
groundwater districts, they have significantly curtailed the influence of state 
engineers and the prior appropriation doctrine. 
And where surface-water irrigation communities prize their valuable 
senior rights during water shortages, groundwater communities typically stress the 
need to treat all groundwater irrigators equally to reduce water use.202 Indeed, many 
groundwater irrigators have argued to abandon prior appropriation altogether by 
comparing groundwater to any other mineral resource that should be mined without 
regard to sustainability. One hundred and sixty years after California blessed the 
analogy of mining customs to water use, these irrigators have forced that analogy to 
its logical extreme: no one in his or her right mind keeps gold in the ground. 
 
 200. Griggs, supra note 166, at 1299–1300 (reporting just 16 impairment claims filed in Kansas 
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Ogallala Aquifer, 15 WYO. L. REV. 413, 428–29 (2015). 
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III. THE COLLISION OF POLITICAL CULTURES IN THE 
REPLUBLICAN RIVER BASIN 
The overdevelopment of groundwater across the Great Plains began to 
reduce the region’s stream and river flows as early as the 1960s.203 By the 1980s, 
interstate conflicts over these declining river systems started to reach the Supreme 
Court, which decides interstate disputes.204 Texas sued New Mexico over the Pecos 
River, and Kansas sued Colorado over the Arkansas.205 These lawsuits followed the 
typical pattern of interstate water litigation: the downstream state sues the upstream 
state (or states), alleging that excessive upstream use, usually caused by under-
regulated groundwater pumping, is violating its rights by depleting supplies 
downstream. 
A. The Conflict on the Surface 
The fight over the Republican River Basin is no exception. It began with 
excessive groundwater development. By the end of the 1970s, Colorado and 
Kansas had responded to groundwater declines by closing their portions of the 
Basin to new wells, limiting their number to about 4,000 in each state. By contrast, 
Nebraska did not impose restrictions. As a result, the number of wells in Nebraska 
increased by more than 50 percent, from around twelve thousand to more than 
eighteen thousand, and irrigated acreage increased even more.206 This increased 
pumping intercepted groundwater base flows that would have otherwise supported 
the surface waters of the Basin. Inflows to the tributaries and mainstem of the river, 
as well as lakes and reservoirs, declined accordingly. Figure 2 shows how this 
increase in irrigated acreage and groundwater pumping caused a drop in the Basin’s 
largest reservoir, Harlan County Lake, which supplies water to irrigators in the 
Nebraska Bostwick Irrigation District (NBID) and KBID.  
While inflows can vary according to annual fluctuations in precipitation, 
the overall trend is undeniable: the increase in groundwater pumping beyond 
sustainable levels produced a significant decline in both surface flows and 
groundwater levels in Nebraska’s portion of the Basin. In Perkins, Chase, and 
Dundy Counties, groundwater levels have fallen more than fifty feet.207 
   
 
 203. By 2009, groundwater pumping had dried up most of the previously perennial streams of 
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Figure 2 
 
 
The declines in reservoir inflows reached a critical point during the 1990s. 
In 1998, Kansas sued, alleging that groundwater pumping in Nebraska had 
deprived Kansas of the water to which it was entitled under the Compact.208 The 
Compact, however, contained a problem: enacted decades before groundwater 
pumping became significant, it did not mention groundwater. The Compact refers 
neither to “surface water” nor to “groundwater,” but rather allocates the “virgin 
water supply,” which is defined as “the water supply within the Basin undepleted 
by the activities of man.”209 As a threshold issue, then, was groundwater even 
included in the Compact’s allocation of the Basin’s water supply? Kansas alleged 
that Nebraska’s many thousands of wells in the Republican River Basin and its 
failure to protect surface flows had caused Nebraska to appropriate far more of the 
“virgin water supply” of the Basin than the Compact allocated to Nebraska.210 Both 
Nebraska and Colorado presented legal defenses which largely conformed to their 
respective state water laws. Nebraska asserted that the Compact did not restrict 
groundwater pumping, because it did not mention groundwater.211 Colorado 
claimed that the Compact at most included alluvial groundwater, but excluded 
Ogallala groundwater—a position consistent with Colorado’s statutory distinction 
 
 208. Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, Kansas v. Nebraska, 525 U.S. 1101 (May 1998) 
(No. 126, Orig.). Kansas’s lawsuit was directed at Nebraska, but because Colorado is a party to the 
Compact, it was necessary to include Colorado in the case. 
 209. Republican River Compact, ch. 104, art. II, 57 Stat. 86, 87 (1943). 
 210. See First Report of the Special Master, supra note 24, at 23–31. 
 211. Id. at 21. 
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between tributary and non-tributary groundwater.212 The court ruled mostly for 
Kansas on this issue, deciding that the Compact required an accounting of 
groundwater pumping that caused depletions to the river’s flows.213 Following that 
threshold decision, the states began to negotiate the remaining issues in the case. 
These negotiations produced a comprehensive settlement agreement, the 
Final Settlement Stipulation of 2002 (FSS). The FSS formally integrated the 
Basin’s groundwater supplies within the allocations of the Compact. Through the 
FSS, the states imposed a general moratorium on additional wells within the 
Basin.214 They established accounting procedures to calculate groundwater 
consumption according to the states’ respective Compact allocations.215 Assisted by 
the United States Geological Survey as well as Reclamation, they produced a 
computer groundwater model, the Republican River Compact Administration 
Groundwater Model (RRCA Model), which estimates the impact of groundwater 
pumping on streamflows across the Basin.216 The Court trumpeted this technically 
intensive, negotiated settlement as superior to any result that litigation could have 
produced.217 Interstate cooperation had apparently produced that rarest of things: 
interstate comity, the Panglossian goal of every water compact.218 
Yet despite the lawsuit, the Court’s approval of the FSS, and the FSS 
itself, Nebraska did not reduce its groundwater pumping in the Basin. As Figure 2 
reveals, Nebraska continued to increase its irrigated acreage even after the FSS was 
signed in 2002. Dry years returned to the Basin, groundwater irrigators 
compensated for drought by increasing their pumping, and Nebraska again violated 
the Compact. In 2005 and 2006, Nebraska overused its allocations by more than 
35,000 acre-feet per year.219 As a result, Kansas alleged, the long-term depletions 
to surface-water supplies caused by groundwater pumping continued to increase in 
both Nebraska and Kansas.220 
In 2010, Kansas returned to the Court to enforce the Compact and the 
FSS, seeking a combination of legal and equitable remedies.221 It sought monetary 
damages to compensate Kansas for its losses for Nebraska’s 2005–2006 
noncompliance.222 Alternatively, Kansas asked the Court to order the disgorgement 
of Nebraska’s gains from that noncompliance. Nebraska’s sustained overpumping 
of groundwater upstream in the Basin had created long-term depletions to 
streamflows, exacerbating transit losses on streams and creating lagged depletions 
 
 212. Id. at 42; for the Colorado distinction, see supra text accompanying notes 155–159. 
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in groundwater baseflow.223 Because these losses accumulate over time, Nebraska’s 
overuse exceeded Kansas’s water shortage; as a consequence, Nebraska’s financial 
gains were “very much larger than Kansas’s loss, likely by several multiples.”224 
After the settlement of the first round of litigation in 1998–2003, Nebraska fully 
understood these impacts, but failed to take adequate steps to insure against 
noncompliance.225 As Special Master William J. Kayatta Jr. concluded, “Nebraska 
hoped to comply, but knowingly failed.”226 He found that a partial disgorgement of 
Nebraska’s gains was an appropriate remedy for the noncompliant years of 2005–
2006, the only years at issue in the case; however, if Nebraska failed to comply in 
the future, it could be forced to disgorge all of its profits gained by 
noncompliance.227 The Court approved the Special Master’s recommendation, 
finding that Nebraska had “recklessly gambled with Kansas’s rights” and should 
therefore pay $5.5 million in damages and disgorgement accordingly.228 The Court 
put Nebraska on notice that if it were to relapse again into noncompliance, it “may 
again be subject to disgorgement gains—either in part or in full, as the equities 
warrant.”229 The Court’s award of disgorgement gains established a landmark 
precedent in the history of interstate water litigation, one that other states are 
already seeking to exploit.230 
Kansas also sought a dramatic equitable remedy: the reduction of 170,000 
acres of groundwater pumping within Nebraska’s portion of the Basin.231 
According to Kansas’s chief engineer, this was the minimum amount of retirement 
necessary to restore hydrological balance to an over-pumped and over-stressed 
groundwater system.232 Such a remedy would interfere substantially with 
Nebraska’s longstanding plan to comply with the Compact through a series of 
Integrated Management Plans (IMPs).233 The IMP’s provide an interlocal 
mechanism between Nebraska’s NRD’s, which exercise local control over 
groundwater pumping, and Nebraska DNR, which exercises centralized control 
over surface water rights.234 Nebraska has also enacted statutes defining the terms 
“over-appropriated” and “fully appropriated” for its compacted river basins, with 
corresponding regulatory requirements.235 Neither the Special Master nor the Court 
adopted this remedy: they did not intervene to change Nebraska’s compliance 
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policy. The IMP’s survived Kansas’s attack, largely because the Court was 
satisfied with these statutory changes; the Court was convinced that Nebraska had 
“significantly restructured its regulation of groundwater pumping.”236 
B. The Deeper Conflict over Future Compliance 
Will Kansas’s legal victory be enough to protect its portion of the Basin’s 
water supplies? While the Supreme Court awarded monetary damages to Kansas 
and threatened Nebraska with disgorgement in the future, it did not overrule 
Nebraska law and order reductions in the state’s groundwater pumping. (On the 
contrary, it allowed Nebraska’s groundwater pumping to increase.237) The Court 
may have just postponed the interstate legal fight for another day, allowing 
Nebraska (and Colorado) to figure out how best to comply with the Compact in the 
meantime. 
The fight is by no means over; the decision has highlighted the issue of 
future compliance. Colorado and Nebraska, where groundwater interests dominate 
their portions of the Basin, have devised Compact compliance plans that protect 
their current groundwater pumping levels by shifting the burden of compliance to 
surface-water irrigation projects. In Nebraska, surface-water irrigation communities 
have sued their parent state in state and federal court, sought help from 
Reclamation, and even assisted the state of Kansas to obtain protection from these 
compliance plans.238 
The interstate legal fight over the future of the Republican River has thus 
generated a series of proxy wars between surface-water and groundwater irrigation 
communities within Nebraska. And due to the dominance of groundwater interests 
there, the future probably holds a paradoxical end, where legal compliance with the 
Compact comes at the expense of the river itself and the surface-water communities 
that depend upon it. This is not what the Compact’s framers intended; they believed 
emphatically in a perpetual river with secure surface water supplies.239 
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Both Colorado and Nebraska have struggled to comply with the Compact 
because their excessive groundwater pumping has depleted surface flows and 
groundwater baseflows across their portions of the Basin. To achieve compliance 
over the long term, these states have a choice. They can reduce groundwater 
pumping to correct this hydrologic imbalance, but that option will significantly 
reduce the amount of acreage irrigated by groundwater. Instead, they have chosen a 
more complicated option that is engineered to protect groundwater pumping from 
forced reductions. This option obtains the water necessary for Compact compliance 
from elsewhere: by sacrificing water supplies devoted to surface-water rights, and 
by pumping distant groundwater and then piping that water directly into the 
river.240 
Nebraska’s approach to compliance lies in its IMPs.241 While these plans 
involve coordinating Nebraska’s segregated laws for surface water and 
groundwater, that coordination remains largely under local control.242 As a result, 
the IMPs have not seriously addressed the problem of excessive pumping. While 
they do include provisions that plan to reduce groundwater pumping from peak 
levels, and require pumping reductions as a last resort, in practice they have 
sacrificed surface-water supplies when water has run short.243 In dry years, when 
Nebraska needs to reduce water use, the IMPs have effectively required that all 
surface-water rights in the Basin be administered before shutting off any 
groundwater wells.244 
During the water-short years of 2013 and 2014, that is just what Nebraska 
did. Rather than reduce groundwater pumping, the Nebraska DNR issued closing 
notices for all surface-water rights in Nebraska’s portion of the Basin, including 
those held by Reclamation projects.245 These projects went without water for much 
of 2013 and 2014, while Nebraska groundwater irrigators did not suffer pumping 
reductions. In the name of integrated water management, Nebraska has chosen to 
sacrifice its surface rights.246 
This choice reveals the stark power divide in Nebraska water law. While 
Nebraska DNR has the legal duty to protect senior surface-water rights according 
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to the prior appropriation doctrine, neither that duty nor that doctrine extends to 
groundwater. Because Nebraska DNR has no jurisdiction over groundwater 
pumping, it cannot order the local NRDs to reduce pumping in dry years. As a 
result, Nebraska’s principal response to the cause of its noncompliance with the 
Compact—excessive groundwater pumping—is to shut down the very rights most 
affected by that pumping—senior surface rights. The architects of the IMPs have 
decided that cutting off senior water rights during shortages is preferable to 
curtailing junior groundwater pumpers. 
Nebraska has singled out surface-water rights because they fall under the 
jurisdiction of the state through the DNR. As a result, in dry years, when the legal 
protections afforded by the Compact matter most, the IMPs transform the 
reservoirs of federal irrigation projects, such as the Frenchman-Cambridge 
Irrigation District (FCID) and NBID, into little more than large holding ponds to 
deliver water to Kansas.247 In late 2013, after holding unused water in Basin 
reservoirs for nearly a year, the DNR ordered Reclamation to flush water out of 
Harlan County Lake so it would flow down into Kansas to meet Nebraska’s 
Compact requirements. The DNR ordered the release even though that water could 
not be put to beneficial use in Nebraska or Kansas: irrigation season had ended 
months earlier, and the flush drained water supplies that had been stored in 2013 
for irrigation use during 2014.248 Groundwater irrigators, meanwhile, pumped 
throughout the year at their usual levels. The DNR does not regulate them. 
The power of Nebraska’s groundwater irrigation interests dwarfs that of 
its surface-water irrigation projects.249 Groundwater irrigators have secured local 
control through the NRDs; the NRDs have gained control over the IMPs; and the 
IMPs protect groundwater pumping at the expense of surface-water irrigators. 
Groundwater interests in Nebraska have exploited the legal segregation of surface-
water and groundwater to control the state’s Compact compliance strategy. 
The IMPs clearly reflect the political realities of water in Nebraska. State 
political leaders—governors, attorneys general, and directors of natural resource 
agencies—are often tempted to disregard their compact obligations to other states, 
rather than face the political consequence of making the unpopular decision to 
reduce groundwater pumping.250 A state supreme court can also be a formidable 
obstacle to state regulation of groundwater pumping; indeed, that is what has 
sometimes happened in Colorado, despite its more sophisticated approach to 
groundwater.251 
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Groundwater interests in Colorado have taken major steps to eradicate 
surface water irrigation from their portion of the Basin. Groundwater districts have 
purchased surface water rights that once diverted water from the North Fork and 
the South Fork of the Republican River and retired them permanently.252 Financed 
by its own substantial irrigated land and water right assessments253 and assisted by 
a low-interest loan from the State of Colorado, the Republican River Water 
Conservation District (RRWCD) had spent around $51 million by 2011 to purchase 
and retire water rights.254 On the South Fork, Colorado has taken a more dramatic 
step by draining Bonny Reservoir, a Reclamation project where it holds all the 
water rights. See Figure 3.  
These surface-water rights are not connected to an irrigation project; 
Reclamation conceived of one to operate in tandem with private ditches that 
predated the reservoir, but never built it. Rather, the rights in Bonny are 
recreational ones, dedicated to fishing, wildlife, and boating. Due to upstream 
groundwater pumping, streamflow on the South Fork has been declining for 
decades, reducing the level in the reservoir. By 2000, Colorado faced a choice with 
Bonny: reduce upstream groundwater pumping to preserve and possibly restore it, 
or drain it to free up water for groundwater pumping.255 By choosing the second 
option, Colorado no longer suffers the evaporative and seepage losses that count 
against its Compact allocations. 
Subordinating surface-water supplies to groundwater pumping is the 
necessary first step in these Compact compliance plans, but it is far from sufficient. 
The second step consists of a series of “augmentation plans,” in which Colorado 
and Nebraska have invested hundreds of millions. The augmentation plan 
originated in Colorado, where it has become a popular water-management tool. It 
enables junior groundwater pumpers to secure their water rights and keep pumping 
during shortages as long as they have a legally binding plan to “augment” the water 
supply—to provide substitute water to senior rights holders that are affected by out-
of-priority pumping.256 By the time the Compact was litigated in 1998, 
augmentation plans had spread across Colorado’s eastern river basins. At a late 
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point in the settlement negotiations, Colorado introduced the concept of 
augmentation plans at the interstate level, and the RRCA agreed to allow them.257 
    
 
 257. Final Settlement Stipulation, supra note 22, at 15. 
Figure 3: The Draining of Bonny Reservoir, 2011 
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Envisioned as a limited exception to the states’ moratorium on 
groundwater development, augmentation plans are becoming the dominant tool by 
which Colorado and Nebraska plan to comply with the Compact. These 
augmentation projects pump groundwater from supplies that are hydrologically 
more distant from the Republican River, such as the Ogallala Aquifer. Pumping 
from these more distant sources creates a smaller effect on the Compact accounting 
than pumping from wells closer to the river, such as alluvial wells. The projects 
then pipe that groundwater to tributaries and dump it there, where it augments 
streamflows. This artificial transportation of more distant groundwater 
compensates for depletions to streamflow caused by groundwater pumping closer 
to the tributaries and mainstem of the river, which has a correspondingly greater 
effect on the Compact accounting. It is important to note that these plans do not 
augment the water supply of the Basin; rather, they use low-impact groundwater 
pumping (as determined by the RRCA accounting procedures and the RRCA 
Model) to offset the effects of high-impact groundwater pumping (also as 
determined by the same procedures and model).258 Put another way, interstate 
augmentation plans solve the legal and accounting problem of a diminished river 
by replumbing it—by connecting it to distant groundwater sources. 
In the wake of the 1998–2003 litigation, Colorado established the 
RRWCD, a local political entity with substantial powers and discretion in devising 
means of complying with the Compact.259 The RRWCD includes several 
groundwater-management districts, and contains nearly half a million irrigated 
acres. Colorado then loaned the RRWCD millions of dollars at low interest rates to 
develop a compliance plan. The RRWCD used $51 million to retire surface 
rights.260 Next, it spent more than $20 million to build the Colorado Compact 
Compliance Pipeline, or CCP. This project pumps as much as 25,000 acre-feet of 
Ogallala Aquifer water annually from a battery of high-capacity wells, pipes it to a 
point just west of the Nebraska border, and then dumps it into the North Fork 
Republican River. As that water flows past the state line gage, it compensates for 
Colorado’s groundwater overuse under the Compact. All told, the RRWCD has 
spent nearly $100 million on the project, which should enable Colorado to comply 
with the Compact while allowing most irrigators to maintain their groundwater 
pumping at current levels.261 
For the retained believers—the leaders of the RRWCD, their engineers, 
their lawyers, and their state officials—the CCP is a clinical and perfectly legal 
solution to an intractable problem: the limitations of the hydrologic cycle. These 
experts point out the reality of accumulated groundwater depletions. Even if 
Colorado stopped all groundwater pumping in its part of the Basin, it could not 
comply with the Compact for decades without the CCP; the river system is that far 
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out of balance.262 The CCP may well provide its backers with more than a century 
of water; time will tell. From a layman’s perspective, Colorado’s approach to 
compliance may seem odd, and even upside-down. It drains a federal reservoir on 
the South Fork, while pumping nonrenewable Colorado Ogallala groundwater into 
a pipeline on the North Fork—so that Colorado can pump more groundwater. The 
approach officially sanctions the dewatering of northeastern Colorado under the 
legal cover of augmentation, ultimately replacing a real if struggling river with a 
bad replica of one. 
Yet the only perspective that really matters is local. In 2007, the Colorado 
Division of Water Resources proposed draft rules requiring the curtailment of 
groundwater wells in the RRWCD; these rules faced withering opposition and were 
promptly and permanently shelved.263 Dennis Coryell, a leader and former 
president of the RRWCD, speaks plainly about the interests and assumptions of his 
groundwater irrigation community. “We were given two tasks. One was to assist 
the State in reaching compact compliance. The other was to sustain the 
agricultural-based economy in the Basin,” he said. Given those goals, the only 
option was to drain Bonny and tap the Ogallala Aquifer. “No one wants to pump 
our precious groundwater and send it down the river, but we have no other choice,” 
he explained.264 For Coryell and his fellow groundwater irrigators, the 
“agricultural-based economy” is the current situation of groundwater irrigation at 
its present pumping levels; they are not inclined to acknowledge any other kind. 
Reduced levels of groundwater irrigation are not politically possible given the 
amount of irrigation water that corn requires in eastern Colorado. As long as corn is 
king across the Ogallala Aquifer, neither sustainable irrigation levels nor dryland 
farming will be an acceptable option. 
And so Colorado had no other choice but to drain Bonny Reservoir, and 
the RRWCD had no other choice but to build the CCP. These are not decisions 
based on water supply. They are grounded in the economic expectations of 
irrigated agriculture—rates of return, purchases of agricultural equipment and 
supplies, and tax revenues, all which support a belief that the present value of 
money exceeds the future value of water. Keep these expectations in mind, and the 
CCP makes sense. 
Where Colorado has concentrated its augmentation efforts on one large 
pipeline, Nebraska has built two so far and may build more. The first pumps 
between 15,000 and 20,000 acre-feet of Ogallala Aquifer water annually and pours 
it into a dry streambed high on Rock Creek, a remote tributary of the Republican 
River. From there the water seeps and flows into the main channel of the river 
above Swanson Reservoir; whatever water enters the river from this pumping 
project counts as a credit to Nebraska under the Compact.265 
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A second pipeline, the Nebraska Cooperative Republican-Platte 
Enhancement Project, or N-CORPE, can pump 65,000 acre-feet of deep 
groundwater every year from beneath the Platte and Republican River Basins to 
meet the state’s multiple interstate obligations. On the Platte, the groundwater helps 
ensure compliance with an interstate agreement with Wyoming, Colorado, and the 
United States to protect endangered species by setting minimum instream flows.266 
On the Republican, N-CORPE pours the pumped groundwater into Medicine 
Creek, shoring up Nebraska’s accounting balance under the Compact.267 The Rock 
Creek and N-CORPE projects pumped nearly 65,000 acre-feet of water into the 
Republican River system in 2014.268 
These projects are expensive, but they pay for themselves, because they 
enable the augmenting states to keep pumping groundwater at present or near-
present levels. N-CORPE cost approximately $130 million.269 Yet without it and 
the Rock Creek Project, Nebraska’s compliance obligations would require the state 
to force the retirement of approximately 330,000 acres in its portion of the Basin, 
forcing farmers into dryland farming and causing a commensurate decline in 
assessed land values of between $500 and $900 million.270 
The impact of these augmentation plans has been substantial. With a 
combined annual capacity of approximately 110,000 acre-feet, these three 
augmentation plans can compensate for significant groundwater over-pumping in 
Colorado and Nebraska under the Compact.271 Hydrologically, they rely upon and 
deplete largely nonrenewable groundwater; ironically, they cause their own, 
additional depletions to streamflows, which in turn must also be offset under the 
Compact accounting.272 These hydrological facts aside, augmentation plans have 
already made a significant impact on the way in which states manage their 
Compact allocations. Unlike delivery compacts such as the Colorado River 
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Compact or the Rio Grande Compact, the Republican River Compact effectively 
adopted something like the precautionary principle: it allocates the Basin across its 
various sub-basins, and requires retrospective accounting.273 These features 
encouraged a certain amount of conservatism in how the states planned their water 
consumption. The groundwater revolution sorely tested this conservatism, and the 
states mostly failed it. By contrast, augmentation not only enables augmenting 
states to replace surface water supplies with increased groundwater pumping; it 
also enables them to retime the river’s flows across the Basin. Augmentation has 
thus changed the dynamics of compliance from one dependent upon the Basin’s 
natural hydrology to one built upon an engineered water delivery system. 
Because the Nebraska augmentation projects pipe groundwater to 
streambeds far upstream from Kansas, something has to be done to shepherd that 
water downstream. To that end, augmentation in Nebraska contains a distinct twist. 
Even though this water technically qualifies as surface water under Nebraska law, 
senior surface-water rights holders in Nebraska cannot divert it to satisfy their 
rights; that is expressly forbidden.274 Augmentation water thus creates a cruel 
spectacle for Nebraska surface-water irrigators. After seeing streamflows decline 
for decades due to groundwater pumping, they can only watch as this augmentation 
water flows downstream past their headgates, and irrigators who depend on 
Reclamation reservoirs can only watch that water evaporate until Nebraska sends it 
downstream to Kansas.275 From the augmentation wells to the state line, no surface-
water irrigators can divert that water in dry years, even if their priorities date to 
1890. First in time, last in right. 
Caught between the pincers of augmentation and surface-water rights 
curtailment, surface-water irrigation communities in Nebraska have come to the 
grudging conclusion that they cannot rely upon their parent state to protect their 
water rights. The Nebraska DNR has effectively ceded control of the Republican 
River to the NRDs, whose IMPs subordinate surface water to groundwater. In a 
state where groundwater irrigates seven times more land than surface water does, 
the Nebraska Unicameral will probably not offer relief. Since 1986, the states have 
known that the Court will not tolerate the efficient breach of an interstate 
compact.276 Upstream states have instead chosen a potentially more efficient use of 
their respective water supplies—but at the expense of their federal irrigation 
projects, which require surface flows. 
Left unprotected, some of these communities took the bold step of 
supporting Kansas in the 2010–2015 litigation—or at least its efforts to reduce 
excessive groundwater pumping. In the 2012–2013 trial in Kansas v. Nebraska, one 
of the largest irrigation districts on the Republican River in Nebraska testified in 
support of Kansas. The FCID stores about 145,000 acre-feet of water in four 
reservoirs, and routes that water through nearly four hundred miles of canals and 
laterals to 66,000 acres. It holds forty-one different Nebraska water rights, whose 
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priorities date back to 1890.277 Over time, depletions due to the overdevelopment of 
groundwater irrigation reduced the amount of water flowing into the district, 
harming canals which depend on regular use, and reducing return flows upon 
which certain district lands depend. More recently, the IMPs have made that 
situation worse by shutting down the district in dry years. At the trial, the FCID 
also provided testimony showing that groundwater development had substantially 
reduced the amount of land the district could irrigate, and that Nebraska DNR had 
also excluded surface-water irrigators from the IMP process.278 Officials from 
Reclamation provided similar testimony, arguing that Nebraska’s overdevelopment 
of groundwater, as well as its IMPs, threatened the long-term water supply for 
Reclamation facilities in Nebraska.279 
Nebraska vigorously opposed this testimony, offering a different vision 
altogether. From a hydrological perspective, it argued that long-term declines in 
reservoir inflows were primarily the consequence of upstream conservation 
practices, such as watershed dams, field terracing, and more efficient irrigation 
methods.280 From a legal perspective, Nebraska viewed its obligations under the 
Compact and the Reclamation Act as distinct and severable; and the former, 
pursuant to Hinderlider, always trumped the latter.281 For Kansas and Reclamation, 
the security of Reclamation’s water supplies and Nebraska’s ability to comply with 
the Compact were legally, historically, and hydrologically inseparable.282 Faced 
with such a choice, Nebraska surface-water irrigation communities within the 
FCID assisted Kansas to protect the district’s Nebraska water rights—ones held by 
Reclamation.283 
The litigation alliance between the State of Kansas and Reclamation 
districts in Nebraska during the 2010–2015 litigation reveals how the conflict 
between surface-water and groundwater irrigation communities has substantially 
supplanted state-based allegiances with water-based ones. The interstate conflict 
over the Republican River has generated a proxy war between these communities, 
and it does not observe political borders.284 Neither does the river: it responds to 
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the different effects of groundwater and surface-water irrigation across the Basin. 
The discrepancy between political boundaries and hydrological reality has created a 
parallel discrepancy between the sovereignty of the states and the hydrological 
integrity of the Basin as a whole. 
Just how these discrepancies are resolved will probably determine the 
future of the Republican River. Colorado and Nebraska have made their sovereign 
decisions to over-pump groundwater, dry up the river, and replace its flows with 
water pumped from the Ogallala Aquifer. Kansas, along with surface-water 
irrigation communities in Nebraska, have traditionally objected to these decisions 
because they upset the dependability of river flows upon which its irrigators 
depend. The states answer to their respective publics; in the Colorado and Nebraska 
portions of the Basin, groundwater irrigation communities have appropriated theirs. 
Barring federal intervention, they may well prevail in the long run, regardless of 
what the Supreme Court holds. 
C. The Fragmented Basin 
1. Nebraska’s Compliance Approach 
To recap: since the onset of the litigation in Kansas v. Nebraska in 2010, 
Nebraska has remained steadfast in its general approach to compliance with the 
Compact during times of shortage. The state has become substantially reliant upon 
augmentation projects financed by its Republican River Basin NRD’s, to deliver 
water into Harlan County Lake.285 Nebraska DNR has repeatedly curtailed all 
surface diversion and storage water rights in the Republican River Basin, largely to 
protect water pumped from its augmentation projects from being diverted by 
Nebraska surface-water irrigators.286 It has ordered releases from Harlan County 
Lake outside of the irrigation season, sending stored water downstream to shore up 
its account balances under the Compact accounting procedures of the FSS, thereby 
preventing both NBID and KBID from carrying over that water supply for the next 
year.287 Left largely unattended is the hydrological cause of its repeated 
noncompliance: excessive groundwater pumping.288 
Nebraska’s approach to Compact compliance has produced a conflict 
within federal law between the law of the Compact and Reclamation law. That such 
a conflict might arise seems at first unlikely, given how cooperative federalism 
permeates the Compact. Its provisions repeatedly emphasize joint action between 
the compacting states and the United States, to promote the most efficient 
“beneficial consumptive use” of the waters of the Basin.289 Article VI grants 
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downstream states undeniable rights to the use of federal reservoirs constructed in 
upstream states.290 Article X states that nothing in the Compact shall be used to 
impair the rights of the United States in and to the waters of the Basin.291 The 
United States insisted upon Articles X and XI in the wake of President Roosevelt’s 
veto of the penultimate version of the Compact.292 
Reclamation law permeates the Compact as well—if not explicitly so.293 A 
principal purpose of the Compact was to secure federal irrigation and flood-control 
infrastructure in the Basin.294 As a consequence, the Compact’s provisions evince 
many of the same concerns which figure prominently in the protections afforded 
Reclamation projects under federal law. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 
generally defers to state law, but with two conspicuous exceptions: “the right to the 
use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the 
land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the 
right.”295 Later amendments to the 1902 Act have reaffirmed these appurtenance 
and beneficial use requirements, either verbatim or by explicit reference.296 Both of 
these requirements are specific congressional directives which displace state law.297 
The 1944 Flood Control Act prohibits the Corps from making releases from Corps 
reservoirs if those releases would conflict with the beneficial consumptive use of 
the released waters.298 It should therefore come as no surprise that these federal 
statutes regarding the use of Reclamation water supplies and the operation of 
federal reservoirs correspond well with the multiple statements regarding the 
efficient beneficial consumptive use of the waters of the Basin, as set forth in 
Articles I, IV, VI, and XI of the Compact.299 These provisions were contained in 
the original 1902 Act, and they remain in effect.300 
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Nebraska’s compliance approach thus raises several potential legal 
problems. The first problem concerns whether it accords with the Compact itself. 
Nebraska’s imperative is to comply with the allocation limits of the Compact and 
the FSS, through a combination of forecasting methods and regulatory controls 
which emphasize surface water rights curtailments.301 This approach focuses on the 
allocation limits set forth in Article IV of the Compact and the FSS, but it has 
created what is arguably a condition of effective noncompliance with less 
prominent provisions of the Compact—the requirements for efficient and beneficial 
use of the compacted water supply, for interstate cooperation regarding the 
management of upper-state reservoirs, and for the protection of federal 
infrastructure.302 The second problem concerns whether Nebraska’s approach 
violates the Reclamation Act. To deliver augmentation water to Harlan County 
Lake and to balance its compliance ledger, Nebraska has decided to override the 
long-established operation of federal reservoirs. It has prohibited the diversion, 
storage, and beneficial use of water within Reclamation districts located within 
Nebraska, allocating those water supplies to its compliance ledger, all while 
allowing groundwater pumping to continue.303 
Nebraska’s compliance approach raises similarly vexing operational 
problems, given the interstate structure of Reclamation’s Bostwick project and 
Harlan County Lake, which supplies water to both NBID and KBID. When 
Nebraska’s closing notices prohibited NBID from accessing water in 2013 and 
2014, they effectively bifurcated the Bostwick Project between NBID and KBID, 
significantly complicating the longstanding water supply contracts for the 
respective districts, as well as the FSS’s consensus plan for joint management of 
the lake by both districts.304 These contracts assume joint usage and management of 
project water stored in Harlan County Lake, allocating repayment obligations 
according to the districts’ respective water usage. Thus, if NBID receives no water 
under Nebraska’s compliance approach, KBID runs the risk of shouldering greater 
repayment obligations. Nebraska’s delivery of water pumped from upstream 
augmentation projects has also raised the issue of whether such water delivered to 
Harlan County Lake constitutes “project water” or not.305 That issue is important. 
For if augmentation water becomes project water, then it becomes generally subject 
to Reclamation law, thus complicating Nebraska’s compliance approach, which 
calls for the management of that water supply as a supply distinct from 
Reclamation projects.306 The Reclamation Act generally defines “project” as a 
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federal irrigation project authorized by Reclamation law.307 Federal regulations 
define “nonproject” water as water from sources other than Reclamation project 
facilities.308 Yet KBID’s master contract with Reclamation defined project water as 
“the total supply of water made available in any irrigation season” for the Bostwick 
Project, “by or through the United States under the Federal Irrigation Laws. . . .”309 
Under its compliance approach, Nebraska has asserted its control over the 
disposition of augmentation water derived from upstream pumping sites and 
shepherded downstream into Harlan County Lake, including the authority to order 
releases to meet its Compact compliance requirements.310 
2. The Showdown at Harlan County Lake, 2012-2013 
Nebraska’s compliance strategy soon began to drive a wedge between the 
Compact and the Reclamation Act. As Kansas v. Nebraska went to trial in the 
summer of 2012, Nebraska was once again struggling to comply with the Compact 
during another dry year in the Basin. That December, Nebraska DNR forecasted 
that it would overuse its 2013 Compact allocation by approximately 23,000 acre-
feet.311 Meanwhile, Reclamation computed the storage in Harlan County Lake to be 
less than 119,000 acre-feet, thus triggering “water-short administration” under the 
FSS.312 Under Nebraska’s IMP’s, that situation required “additional management 
actions . . . to ensure compliance.”313 Nebraska DNR informed Kansas of its plans 
to comply with the Compact: Nebraska would issue closing notices prohibiting the 
diversion and storage of natural flow of surface waters within Nebraska’s portion 
of the Basin, and it might be required to release water from Harlan County Lake 
outside of irrigation season.314 As a consequence, that water would not be 
beneficially used by KBID, and would not applied to its appurtenant lands—in 
apparent violation of the Reclamation Act.315 
Nebraska then placed the onus on Reclamation to develop a plan that 
would allow for 2013 inflows to be re-regulated for KBID, while keeping Nebraska 
in compliance with the Compact.316 Reclamation found itself caught between 
Nebraska’s imperative to comply with the Compact and its duties to supply both 
NBID and KBID with water pursuant to its own contracts. In an effort to avoid 
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Nebraska’s closing notices to Reclamation reservoirs and projects, Reclamation 
made a request to the Corps, which operates Harlan County Lake outside of 
irrigation season. Specifically, it requested the Corps to deviate from its usual 
management of Harlan County Lake, by making 20,000 acre-feet of water that was 
dedicated to the sediment pool available to KBID as irrigation supply during the 
2013 irrigation season—approximately the amount of Nebraska’s forecasted 
noncompliance.317 Reclamation was seeking to buy time and flexibility for its 
projects in both states. It requested Nebraska to condition its closing notices for all 
federal reservoirs in Nebraska’s portion of the Basin until the Corps decided to 
make the water available.318 Nebraska DNR agreed to Reclamation’s request. On 
January 1, 2013, it issued closing notices for all surface water appropriations in the 
Republican River Basin,319 but assured Reclamation it would seek to “work out an 
agreement” that might reduce Compact-induced releases from Harlan County Lake, 
provided the Corps allowed Reclamation’s deviation request to reallocate water 
from the sediment pool to project water.320 Reclamation was also concerned with 
water supplies for NBID, which shares Harlan County Lake supplies with KBID: 
releases from the lake would prevent both districts from putting those supplies to 
beneficial use.321 
As winter turned to spring in the Basin, negotiations between Nebraska, 
Reclamation, and the Corps began to break down. Nebraska’s plan to place its 
Compact commitments above and against Reclamation’s operation of federal 
reservoirs and deliveries to its irrigation districts was meeting with federal 
resistance. By mid-March, 2013, the Corps had not yet agreed to Reclamation’s 
deviation request; Nebraska DNR thus notified the Corps that it would soon order 
releases of water stored since that January in all federal reservoirs in the Basin, 
including Harlan County Lake.322 Nebraska objected to federal efforts to allocate 
project water stored in Harlan County Lake between NBID and KBID. Given 
Nebraska’s Compact compliance requirements and its IMP’s, Nebraska stressed 
that no water stored in Harlan County Lake since January 1, 2013 could be 
allocated to NBID: its use of project water would increase Nebraska’s consumptive 
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use under the Compact, undermining Nebraska’s compliance plan under the 
IMP’s.323 Asserting Nebraska’s sovereign right to prohibit a Nebraska irrigation 
district from storing and diverting water, Nebraska DNR made its position clear: 
Reclamation could not allocate water to NBID under Reclamation water-supply 
contracts, because those contracts “are subservient” to Nebraska’s need to comply 
with the Compact.324 On March 22, 2013, and in light of Reclamation’s position 
and Nebraska DNR’s compliance plan, Nebraska repeated its threat to the Corps 
that it would order the release of all water stored in Reclamation reservoirs in the 
Basin between January 1 and March 31, 2013, including Harlan County Lake.325 
The Corps pointedly avoided taking a position between Nebraska and Kansas. 
Instead, it recommended that the RRCA change its accounting procedures to allow 
water which Nebraska had delivered to Harlan County Lake for compliance 
purposes to be held there for subsequent use.326 In the meantime, the states 
appeared to be on their own. 
If the water in Harlan County were to be released in March, it would flow 
down into Kansas, but KBID would be unable to put it to beneficial consumptive 
use as the Compact intended: irrigation season was months away, and its Kansas 
storage facility, Lovewell Reservoir, was mostly full.327 Aware of that situation, 
Kansas DWR had been negotiating in parallel with Nebraska, Reclamation, and the 
Corps. One week after Nebraska DNR had threatened to release water out of 
Harlan County Lake, Kansas DWR notified the Corps of its own position. Whereas 
Nebraska had stressed that its Compact commitments trumped those of 
Reclamation to its irrigators in Nebraska and Kansas, Kansas argued that the 
purposes of the Compact and those of Reclamation were intertwined; therefore, the 
Corps and Reclamation should not release water from Harlan County Lake until 
KBID was able to put that water to beneficial use during irrigation season.328 
Nebraska agreed to a short-term compromise: on April 1, 2013, it ordered water 
stored in federal reservoirs upstream of Harlan County Lake since that January to 
be released, but excepted Harlan County Lake from the order.329 
By that time, the state’s respective positions regarding Reclamation’s 
management of water stored in federal reservoirs had become clear—and clearly 
opposed. Nebraska placed its Compact commitments above Reclamation’s federal 
commitments to both NBID and KBID, whereas Kansas continued to view the two 
federal commitments as coequal. Consequently, Nebraska DNR refused to 
authorize Reclamation to hold over water delivered to and stored in Harlan County 
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Lake in 2013—with the express purpose of meeting Nebraska’s Compact 
balance—for use within NBID in 2013 or 2014, because such beneficial 
consumptive use within Nebraska would “threaten Nebraska with non-compliance 
in 2013 and beyond.”330 Nebraska again placed the burden upon Reclamation and 
Kansas to provide a management plan for the reservoir that would hold Nebraska 
harmless for any Compact violations resulting from a hold-over of water from one 
year to another.331 Kansas initially refused, and so Nebraska again threatened to 
release water stored in Harlan County Lake on May 1, 2013.332 
The states continued to negotiate this difficult issue. Kansas proposed a 
compromise based on its view of the Compact and Reclamation law as legally and 
operationally interdependent authorities.333 Under Kansas’s proposal, the states, 
Reclamation, and the Corps would agree to establish a Kansas-exclusive irrigation 
account in Harlan County Lake over which Kansas had exclusive control, separate 
from the water supply for both NBID and KBID; but Reclamation’s determination 
of available project water dedicated to both districts would continue, according to 
Reclamation’s contracts and the Consensus Plan of the FSS.334 If Kansas were able 
to obtain such an exclusive account, it would agree to modify the Compact’s 
accounting procedures so that water stored in and released from the Kansas-
exclusive account would not count as water consumed by Nebraska.335 The Kansas 
offer was focused on reservoir management and accounting, and sought to strike a 
balance between the states’ and the United States’ respective interests, but it made 
no bones about Kansas’s position. According to Kansas, the crisis over Harlan 
County Lake stemmed from double intransigence on Nebraska’s part: its decision 
not to reduce excessive groundwater pumping—the source of Nebraska’s 
forecasted noncompliance—and its equally steadfast decision to prevent 
Reclamation from collecting and storing water in the lake.336 Kansas continued to 
assert that the latter decision violated the Compact, based on its interpretation of 
Article VI, which, in Kansas’s view, made it “illegal for an upstream state to 
interfere with the ability of a downstream state to use its Compact allocation 
beneficially by means of storage and delivery of its water through a federal 
irrigation storage project.”337 
Nebraska rejected Kansas’s offer. It did so because Kansas refused to 
provide a waiver of liability to Nebraska for any Compact violations that might 
result from Nebraska’s delivery of augmentation water to Harlan County Lake for 
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Kansas’s benefit, and because Kansas had failed to coordinate, to Nebraska’s 
satisfaction, with Reclamation and the Corps.338 Having rejected the offer, 
Nebraska provided a counter-proposal. Water it delivered to Harlan County Lake in 
2013 would be assigned to Kansas and KBID; Nebraska would be allowed to count 
water delivered through April 15, 2014, to meet its Compact accounting balances 
for 2013.339 In return, Nebraska would not order releases from Harlan County Lake, 
provided Kansas hold Nebraska harmless for any noncompliance caused by “strict 
application of the Compact accounting . . . .”340 If Kansas did not accept this 
proposal, Nebraska would order releases from Harlan County Lake on May 1, 
2013.341 Nebraska flatly disagreed with Kansas’s legal position that Article VI of 
the Compact prevented Nebraska from monopolizing control over Harlan County 
Lake to the detriment of Kansas: because Kansas “in no way participated” in the 
lake’s construction, the Article “simply does not apply.”342 
3. Reclamation’s Response to the Conflict over Compact Compliance 
a. 2013–2015: The Warren Act as Reclamation’s Bridge between the Compact and 
the Reclamation Act 
The showdown over Harlan County Lake in 2012–2013 caught 
Reclamation between its own duties under the Reclamation laws and Nebraska’s 
threat to order releases for Compact compliance purposes.343 As Kansas and 
Nebraska exchanged threats, proposals, and counter-proposals during the spring of 
2013, Reclamation proposed a mechanism to break the stalemate: a supplemental 
water-supply contract between Reclamation and Kansas pursuant to the Warren 
Act.344 An early amendment to the Reclamation Act,345 the Warren Act enables 
Reclamation to enter into contracts for the use of excess stored water346 and excess 
storage capacity347 in Reclamation reservoirs. The logic behind Reclamation’s offer 
seemed reasonable. Reclamation had been working with both states “to provide the 
most efficient and beneficial use of water within the Republican River Basin for 
Reclamation water users”—a clearly implied but unattributed reference to the 
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Compact348—but the parties had been unable to reach an agreement to store water 
in Harlan County Lake for KBID.349 Given the looming threat of a May 1, 2013 
release, Reclamation believed that Kansas could “exercise Article VI of the 
Republican River Compact” and protect water for KBID by entering into a Warren 
Act contract for the storage and carriage of up to 30,000 acre-feet in Harlan County 
Lake, which Reclamation would control.350 If Kansas did not enter into such a 
contract, then Reclamation asserted that it would coordinate with the Corps “to 
comply with any lawful order” from Nebraska DNR for the release of water from 
Harlan County Lake on that date.351 Through this offer, Reclamation believed that 
it could reconcile the states’ respective rights and commitments pursuant to the 
Compact while complying with Reclamation law as well. 
Unfortunately, Reclamation’s belief that a Warren Act contract with 
Kansas could stave off the crisis proved poorly founded. As a threshold matter, the 
Warren Act itself does not allow such contracts to be made with states, a fact which 
Reclamation had apparently not considered.352 Nebraska promptly wrote 
Reclamation to point this out, but also to attack Reclamation’s belief that Kansas 
could invoke Article VI of the Compact to participate in the management of Harlan 
County Lake supplies.353 Because the lake was located in Nebraska, Nebraska law, 
and apparently only Nebraska law, controlled the lake.354 Nebraska thus demanded 
that Reclamation withdraw its offer to Kansas immediately.355 
Whether chastened or corrected by Nebraska’s response, Reclamation 
dropped the matter and focused on KBID, effectively forcing it to enter into a 
series of Warren Act contracts. A May, 2013 contract between Reclamation and 
KBID succeeded in keeping the water in Harlan County Lake; the parties 
subsequently executed two similar contracts.356 In each case, the purpose of these 
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contracts was to secure water supplies in Harlan County Lake provided by 
Nebraska’s augmentation pumping—which Nebraska DNR had shepherded 
downstream to the lake using its closing notices—and then to protect those supplies 
from release orders which might be issued by Nebraska DNR to stay within its 
Compact allocation. The contracts explicitly identified this water supply as non-
project water, and dedicated its use exclusively to KBID for irrigation purposes 
pursuant to Nebraska’s Compact commitments.357 KBID agreed to pay for up to 
30,000 acre-feet of this augmentation water, and apparently agreed further to 
Reclamation’s definition of it as non-project water—in addition to its existing 
contract payments for project water.358 In the event Nebraska ordered a release 
from Harlan County Lake to meet its Compact commitments, the non-project, 
Warren Act water supply would be released before the project water supply.359 As 
the second Warren Act contract was set to expire at the end of 2014, KBID was 
faced with another threat from Nebraska DNR to order releases from Harlan 
County Lake outside of the irrigation season in early 2015; to protect against that 
possibility, KBID entered into a third Warren Act contract just as 2014 ended.360 
KBID subsequently protested against the use of the Warren Act for this 
situation, but it clearly had no choice in the matter if the district were to secure 
water supplies for 2014 and 2015. In a letter to Reclamation sent shortly after the 
execution of the second contract, KBID outlined its objections.361 It questioned the 
legality of the Warren Act mechanism in a situation where the district’s irrigation 
requirements had not been met under its master project water contract.362 It 
complained that the contracts unfairly penalized KBID for Nebraska’s compliance 
actions: if Nebraska was “using Reclamation infrastructure to send pumped 
groundwater down to KBID,” then Nebraska and its Reclamation districts should 
pay their share of the freight.363 KBID explicitly objected to the notion that KBID 
was purchasing Warren Act water so that Nebraska could comply with the 
Compact.364 (In correspondence concerning negotiations over the Warren Act 
contract, Reclamation had repeated its mistaken assertion that “Reclamation could 
also execute a Warren Act contract with the State of Kansas, the State of Nebraska, 
or the Nebraska Natural Resource District for the purchase of water for compact 
compliance.”365) Reclamation had repeatedly stressed that KBID could profit from 
these contracts by marketing the contracted water supplies at a premium to NBID 
and other Nebraska surface water users, thereby lessening the financial burden 
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imposed by the contracts.366 KBID pointed out that such marketing was expressly 
forbidden by the Warren Act itself.367 Clearly frustrated by Reclamation’s changes 
in position about how it would respond to Nebraska’s threatened releases, but 
facing little choice but to accede to the Warren Act contracts, KBID signed: “we 
did this under duress in order to assure a water supply for 2015.”368 Chastised by 
Reclamation for claiming duress, KBID sent a subsequent letter two weeks later, 
apologizing for claiming duress and reaffirming its commitments to the contract.369 
b. Reclamation’s Position Regarding Nebraska’s Compliance Approach 
Reclamation has so far avoided making a formal entrance into Nebraska’s 
intrastate conflict between groundwater and surface-water irrigation in its portion 
of the Basin. Nonetheless, Reclamation has made its position clear regarding how 
Nebraska’s compliance actions affect the use and management of Reclamation 
infrastructure. On the eve of oral argument in Kansas v. Nebraska in September, 
2014, Interior wrote Nebraska DNR to express its concerns about the legality of 
Nebraska’s approach to Compact compliance, and to recommend that Nebraska 
employ a “fundamentally different approach” to compliance that would abide by 
both state and federal law.370 The letter complained of Nebraska DNR’s issuance of 
closing notices on all surface water rights in the Basin during 2013 and 2014, 
including the storage rights for Reclamation reservoirs and for Harlan County 
Lake.371 These closing notices disproportionately affected surface water users, 
forcing severe shortages upon them while leaving groundwater pumpers 
unaffected; and the water supplied by Nebraska’s augmentation projects upstream 
did not arrive in time for irrigation season.372 
The letter remains Interior’s (and therefore Reclamation’s) most complete 
statement of the United States’ legal position concerning Nebraska’s Compact 
compliance strategy in the Basin. Interior asserted that curtailing surface water 
rights while allowing groundwater users to irrigate violated Nebraska state law 
requirements that these groups be treated equitably.373 Interior also alleged that 
Nebraska DNR’s curtailments of surface water supplies violated the IMP’s of the 
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Republican River NRD’s, which contain precatory language appearing to require 
such equitable treatment as well.374 These IMP’s were “fatally flawed,” because 
none of them contained effective groundwater controls: instead, they contained 
mere targets for reductions in pumping—targets that Nebraska was unlikely to 
meet in any case.375 
The letter then turned to federal law. Interior alleged that Nebraska’s 
compliance strategy violated both the Compact and Reclamation law. It stressed the 
Court’s 2002–2003 finding that the Compact requires Nebraska to account for the 
impacts of groundwater pumping on surface water supplies. It went further by 
finding in the Court’s decisions “the fact that Nebraska should be attaining 
compliance with the Compact by curbing groundwater pumping in addition to 
curtailing surface water users.”376 Just as groundwater pumping and surface water 
diversions were connected, so too were “Reclamation’s rights and Nebraska’s 
responsibilities:” the latter could not comply with the Compact in a manner that 
injured the former.377 “Nebraska’s effort to put the burden [of compliance] 
primarily on surface water users is inconsistent with the State’s obligations under 
the Compact and the Supreme Court decision.”378 Interior finally alleged that this 
imbalanced burden also impliedly violated the Reclamation Act. While Interior 
conceded that Reclamation was generally bound to follow Nebraska state law and 
the decisions of Nebraska DNR, that general deference had limits. Where Nebraska 
DNR ordered Reclamation to release stored water, or prohibited the delivery of 
stored water to Reclamation projects, even as Nebraska allowed junior groundwater 
users to continue pumping with far fewer restrictions, such conduct “raises 
questions as to whether state water administration is not just in violation of state 
law, but contrary to federal law concerning federal projects and . . . the mandates of 
the Reclamation program.”379 Providing augmentation water to Reclamation and 
Corps reservoirs late in the irrigation season did not “optimize” beneficial use, but 
defeated it instead.380 Like all demand letters, it closed with a threat of litigation; 
like most such letters, litigation has yet to commence. 
Interior’s formal allegation that Nebraska’s compliance strategy violates 
both the Compact and the Reclamation Act shows how the conflict between 
groundwater and surface-water irrigation across the Great Plains is placing a great 
strain on long-established federalist governance systems for western water, 
possibly to a breaking point. Nebraska DNR, together with the NRDs in the Basin, 
have chosen to protect their groundwater irrigation communities at the expense of 
their surface water ones; but Reclamation represents only the latter. As a 
consequence, the conflict between these irrigation communities has generated a 
serious conflict between state and federal interests in Nebraska’s portion of the 
Basin, one where groundwater pumpers align with the State, while surface water 
irrigators seek the assistance of Reclamation. 
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In defending itself against intrastate litigants and answering Reclamation, 
Nebraska has consistently argued that it has the sovereign right to decide how to 
comply with the Compact, and that the other states, as well as the United States, 
must defer to those sovereign decisions as a well-settled rule of federal law.381 In 
other words, Nebraska has claimed the Hinderlider defense—a defense that has so 
far worked.382 Yet it remains uncertain whether Hinderlider can continue to 
provide an effective categorical defense of Nebraska’s compliance strategy, where 
the end of Compact compliance justifies the means of subordinating Reclamation 
law. That is because the controversies are different. In Hinderlider, the central 
issue was whether a state engineer could administer water rights senior to the La 
Plata River Compact; under Colorado’s prior appropriation doctrine, administration 
of such rights necessarily involved administering (and adjudicating) all junior water 
rights in the basin as well.383 The Court’s resolution in Hinderlider was 
unequivocal—no state water rights holder is entitled to use water to which the 
parent state is not entitled—but it nonetheless rested on the assumption of a 
comprehensive adjudication of water rights in the compact basin.384 Hinderlider 
antedates the groundwater revolution and does not speak to the groundwater-
surface water divide, especially Nebraska’s, where administration of water rights is 
selective and in apparent disregard for the seniority of surface water rights 
compared to groundwater permits.385 
The situation in Hinderlider also seems legally and factually distinct from 
the dispute over the Republican River. Hinderlider is a landmark case largely 
because it demonstrated that the Court would defend interstate compacts, thereby 
providing additional motivation for states to enter into them.386 The compact which 
Hinderlider protected, the La Plata River Compact of 1925, was the first compact 
enacted into federal law.387 As a compact predating later New Deal compacts, New 
Deal Reclamation law such as the Pick-Sloan Act, and the age of federal 
multipurpose reservoirs, it establishes commitments between Colorado and New 
Mexico exclusively, without regard for federal and Reclamation interests. The 
Republican River Compact, by contrast, fully embraces contemporary Reclamation 
law, albeit impliedly so.388 
4. Litigating the Irrigation Divide within Nebraska 
The most frequent challenges to Nebraska’s approach have arisen within 
Nebraska itself, in numerous lawsuits brought by surface-water irrigation districts 
and their members against Nebraska DNR. The plaintiffs’ allegations, as well as 
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the courts’ dispositions of the lawsuits, reveal the extent to which Nebraska’s 
compliance approach has produced a profound and lasting conflict between the 
surface-water and groundwater irrigation communities within Nebraska’s portion 
of the Basin. 
After failing to obtain relief from the IMP’s in 2011,389 FCID joined with 
NBID to bring suit in federal court to enjoin Nebraska’s augmentation pumping 
and to protect the districts’ Nebraska surface water rights.390 The districts sued 
three parties: the Upper Republican Natural Resources District (URNRD), the chief 
sponsor of the N-CORPE augmentation pipeline; Nebraska DNR; and Reclamation. 
Against URNRD, the surface district plaintiffs alleged that the N-CORPE pipeline 
violated the Compact; but perhaps more importantly, they alleged that the pipeline 
subverted their prior appropriation rights established under the Nebraska 
Constitution, by “unlawfully prioritiz[ing]” groundwater pumping over senior 
surface water diversions.391 Against Nebraska DNR, the plaintiffs alleged that 
pumping groundwater to supply the pipeline upset the hydrologic connection 
between groundwater and surface water, endangering the long-term water supplies 
upon which the districts depended; and they alleged further that Nebraska DNR’s 
approval of this conduct violated their duties to manage the waters of the Basin.392 
Against Reclamation, the plaintiffs alleged that it had breached the districts’ water-
supply contracts, and had thereby failed to both supply the districts’ projects and to 
protect their senior surface water rights.393 In essence, the plaintiffs’ allegations 
resembled those which Kansas had brought against Nebraska in its 2010–2015 
Supreme Court case.394 
The defendant parties based their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional, 
immunity, and justiciability grounds. All defendants moved to dismiss for lack of 
federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.C.P. 12(b)(1).395 The URNRD 
and Nebraska DNR also moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 
Fed.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), based on the Eleventh Amendment immunity defense that 
both of these state agencies acted as an “arm of the state” working jointly to 
comply with the Compact; they also argued that the court should not exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over what was essentially a state law claim.396 Nebraska 
DNR further contended that the districts lacked standing to pursue their claims.397 
Reclamation asserted that, as a federal agency, it had not waived its sovereign 
immunity.398 
 
 389. Neb. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 801 N.W. 2d at 259 (finding FCID’s allegations of potential injury 
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The court dismissed the case, largely according to the defendants’ 
motions. It first granted Reclamation’s motion on two federal grounds: first, it 
found that the Reclamation Act’s limited waiver of sovereign of immunity did not 
apply in this case;399 and second, that because this case did not concern a 
comprehensive stream adjudication of the Basin in Nebraska, the McCarran Act did 
not provide a waiver for sovereign immunity.400 Based on those findings, the court 
declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction, dismissing the URNRD and 
Nebraska DNR as well; as a consequence, it did not address the remaining issues of 
standing and Eleventh Amendment immunity.401 
The dismissal is notable for three reasons. First, the court stressed that it 
was not exercising its supplemental jurisdiction because the case “involves novel 
and complex state law issues”—issues concerning the legal relationship between 
surface and groundwater rights under Nebraska law, then pending before Nebraska 
DNR.402 Second, having asserted that the “Republican River Compact is only 
peripheral to the controversy,” the court then recommended that the districts seek 
to intervene in Kansas v. Nebraska—even though trial had already concluded in 
that case, and Special Master Kayatta issued his report shortly thereafter.403 Finally, 
the court made clear that it based its dismissal of Reclamation on the grounds that 
Reclamation had no obligation to sue Nebraska on behalf of its districts; thus, their 
claim was not cognizable under federal law.404 
Undeterred by this setback in federal court, irrigators within FCID 
pursued Nebraska DNR in state court. In Hill v. Nebraska Department of Natural 
Resources, they brought an inverse condemnation lawsuit as a class action, alleging 
that Nebraska DNR’s refusal to regulate and curtail groundwater pumping in the 
Basin, together with its 2013 closing notices, caused damages of approximately 
$76 million for that year.405 Nebraska DNR moved to dismiss based largely on 
Hinderlider: the state’s obligations to comply with the Compact entitled Nebraska 
DNR to administer surface water rights as it saw fit, in order to remain within its 
allocation limits; consequently, the state could not have taken water supplies to 
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which the plaintiffs were not entitled under the Compact.406 Convinced, the district 
court dismissed the case, but granted plaintiffs leave to amend.407 They filed an 
amended complaint in which they added claims for the 2014 irrigation season, 
alleging an additional $143 million in damages for suffering a water shortfall of 
71,755 acre-feet for the 2014 crop year.408 Nebraska DNR then moved to dismiss 
based on the argument that it does not have the statutory duty to regulate 
groundwater; thus, the alleged failure to exercise such a nonexistent duty cannot 
amount to a taking.409 The district court accepted that argument and accordingly 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ first takings claim (Nebraska DNR’s alleged failure to 
regulate groundwater) with prejudice; but the court also found that plaintiffs’ 
second takings claim (Nebraska DNR’s alleged over-administration of surface 
water rights in the Basin) was legitimate and should proceed.410 Other irrigators 
then filed suits making the same claim; Nebraska DNR filed a motion to reconsider 
in Hill I, and motions to dismiss in the other suits. The court resolved these matters 
together by granting Nebraska DNR’s motion to reconsider Hill I, as well as its 
motions to dismiss.411 (Hill III is presently on appeal.412) 
Although the decision in Hill III is on appeal, the conclusions of the 
Furnas County district court describe several forbidding obstacles to protecting 
surface-water irrigation rights in Nebraska. The first obstacle is the police power 
claimed by Nebraska DNR pursuant to Hinderlider—a power allegedly so robust 
that it forecloses any takings claims arising from the curtailment of surface-water 
rights imposed to achieve Compact compliance.413  The second obstacle is, 
paradoxically, powerlessness—a statutory impotence allegedly so complete that it 
precludes Nebraska DNR from regulating groundwater pumping, even regulation 
taken to achieve Compact compliance.414  
The district court did not recognize the potential contradictions between 
Nebraska DNR’s claim to police power on one hand and its defense of statutory 
powerlessness on the other. Ultimately, it rested its decision upon a distinctive view 
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of the property interest in the use of surface water. The court dismissed the case 
largely on the conclusion that a compensable taking for curtailing a surface water 
right can only arise when there is water available for diversion.415 Under the hard 
and arid logic of prior appropriation, this reasoning seems unimpeachable: because 
a water right is not a guarantee of sufficient water to supply that right, junior water 
rights might receive no water supplies during times of actual water shortage. 
However, the court applied that reasoning within an unusual administrative context, 
in which Nebraska DNR, following the dictates of its IMP’s, determined water to 
be unavailable for all surface diversions—even as it allowed groundwater pumping 
to continue. “The right to use the property rights [i.e., surface water rights] incident 
to an appropriation only arises when there is water ‘subject to capture,’ i.e., when 
water is declared to be available.”416 And the determination of that availability lies 
squarely with Nebraska DNR: until it declares that “water is available for 
appropriation,” no protectable property right in surface water exists in Nebraska.417 
Apply this logic to Nebraska groundwater permits, and problems soon 
arise. The court stressed that a Nebraska surface water right does not grant an 
“immediate right to use of the water because there is no discrete, continuously 
existing corpus or physical thing that can be possessed or used by the 
appropriator.”418 But what of groundwater? Some of the chief virtues of 
groundwater are negatively implied in this assertion. Hydrologically, unlike the 
variability of surface water supplies, groundwater tends to be a “continuously 
existing corpus or physical thing” that can be withdrawn and used by Nebraska 
irrigators, available for diversion long after surface streams have diminished.419 
Administratively, the director of Nebraska DNR cannot find such groundwater to 
be unavailable, because he lacks jurisdiction to curtail groundwater pumping; and 
the IMP’s effectively rule out groundwater curtailments during times of shortage 
anyway.420 When, given the hydrological conditions of groundwater pumping in 
Nebraska, and given the administrative conditions of Nebraska’s Compact 
compliance approach, would groundwater be declared to be unavailable for use? 
Probably rarely, if ever; but if it were to happen, such curtailments would appear to 
be compensable takings. According to the court’s reasoning in Hill III, 
groundwater rights appear to be clearly superior property rights compared to 
surface water rights—despite the priority and the constitutional status of the 
former.421 First in time, last in right.422 
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5. Interstate Comity through Anti-federalism: the Resolutions of the 
RRCA, 2014–2016 
By the end of 2014, the governance structure of cooperative federalism in 
the Basin had effectively broken down. Nebraska DNR’s compliance-driven orders 
to release water from Harlan County Lake between 2012 and 2014 had created a 
hostile relationship between Nebraska DNR and the United States over the 
management of Reclamation infrastructure. They had also run the risk of 
preventing KBID from storing water supplies for subsequent irrigation seasons. 
Reclamation had responded to these threats by pressuring KBID into a series of 
Warren Act contracts. These contracts solved the immediate crisis, but required 
KBID to pay for water supplied by upstream augmentation pumping in Nebraska. 
Nebraska’s IMP’s and the closing notices Nebraska DNR issued to FCID and 
NBID had deprived surface-water irrigators in Nebraska of their water supplies, 
forcing them to sue their parent state, so far unsuccessfully. Left unasked in the 
correspondence and the contract negotiations was the underlying hydrological 
question: what made the excess capacity in Harlan County Lake available? With 
few exceptions, the answer was apparently too undiplomatic to be discussed: long-
term declines in inflows resulting from excessive groundwater pumping.423 
Between October 2014 and August 2015, the RRCA passed four 
resolutions in rapid succession, temporarily resolving some of the states’ legal and 
operational disagreements which had caused the showdown at Harlan County Lake. 
They consist essentially of three shared positions taken against Reclamation.424 
First, the states formally blessed the fact that Nebraska would be depending 
substantially on pumped groundwater from its augmentation projects to comply 
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with the Compact—by as much as 63,500 acre-feet for 2014 alone.425 The states 
agreed to account for augmentation water generally as imported water under the 
Compact’s accounting procedures, thereby subtracting it from the “virgin water 
supply” of the Compact and the “computed water supply” of the FSS.426 
Second, Nebraska obtained the blessing of the RRCA to control Harlan 
County Lake, so that it could manage the water supplies derived from its 
augmentation projects for Compact compliance purposes. Nebraska agreed not to 
release or bypass water from Harlan County Lake—the principal threat it had 
employed between 2012 and 2014.427 It also promised to deliver augmentation 
water to the lake, and therefore to KBID and Kansas, in time for irrigation 
season.428 In exchange, Nebraska extracted a second significant concession from 
Kansas: Nebraska could extend its deadline for deliveries of water to Harlan 
County Lake from the end of the year (as the Compact and the accounting 
procedures of the FSS had required) through April and even June of the following 
year—enabling Nebraska to shore up its accounting balances through supplemental 
augmentation pumping.429 
Finally, the states agreed to change the operation and management of 
Harlan County Lake, with escalating opposition to Reclamation’s established 
management role. The resolutions aspired to establish a storage account in Harlan 
County Lake exclusive to the state of Kansas, separate from water allocated to 
NBID and KBID.430 If the states and Reclamation could not establish such a 
Kansas-exclusive account, then they would accept the ongoing Warren Act account 
arrangements with KBID; if neither of those options obtained, then the stored water 
would become “project water” shared between NBID and KBID.431 Less than a 
month later, the states redefined “project water” as water exclusively dedicated to 
KBID; the established memorandum of agreement between NBID, KBID, and 
Reclamation for sharing project water and operations and maintenance costs was 
specifically deemed to be inapplicable.432 Because water supplied by upstream 
augmentation projects now counted as project water, and because NBID was 
excluded from accessing that project water, the RRCA had effectively excised 
NBID from the Bostwick Project during water-short years.433 
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The RRCA approved a longer-term resolution related to the operation of 
Harlan County Lake in August 2016.434 It carries forward the principal elements of 
the earlier resolutions, and captures well the RRCA’s current hostility to the 
operational presence of the United States in the Basin. The resolution comprehends 
“project water” as consisting of all of the flows of the Basin stored in Harlan 
County Lake for use in both states, including augmentation water, without regard to 
Reclamation’s definition of the term.435 It formally integrates Nebraska’s IMP’s 
within the Compact’s administration, including their methods for forecasting 
augmentation delivery volumes.436 The “natural flows” of the Basin now include 
water pumped from Nebraska’s augmentation projects—even though these supplies 
are counted as imported water supply credits, and thus deducted from the 
“computed water supply” of the Basin under the accounting procedures of the 
FSS.437 
Tellingly, the long-term resolution seeks to effect this management by 
creating new water accounts in Harlan County Lake without Reclamation’s prior 
approval. Augmentation water delivered to the lake is expressly limited to use by 
Kansas and KBID, without allocation or subsequent re-allocation to NBID.438 This 
augmentation water is to flow into two different accounts: a “Kansas Account” 
exclusively dedicated to KBID, including water supplies previously available under 
its Warren Act contracts, and a “Kansas Supplemental Account” exclusively 
dedicated for use by Kansas outside of KBID.439 Nebraska promises to make “good 
faith efforts” to deliver augmentation water supplies to the Kansas Account by June 
1 of each year, in time for irrigation season—apparently supplanting Reclamation’s 
traditional duty to make water supplies available to both NBID and KBID.440 The 
RRCA recognized that the United States has yet to recognize and establish these 
two Kansas accounts in Harlan County Lake, and so committed itself to cooperate 
with the United States toward that end.441 Therefore, the accounts which the RRCA 
nominally established in this resolution are best understood as accounting work-
arounds, by which the states can compute compliance without participation by the 
United States in the management of water stored in Harlan County Lake for both 
NBID and KBID. 
The resolution concludes with a striking statement: “compliance with this 
Resolution constitutes compliance” with both the Compact and the FSS.442 By 
creating new (and as yet still nominal) accounts in Harlan County Lake to hold 
 
 434. REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT ADMIN., RESOLUTION APPROVING LONG-TERM AGREEMENTS 
RELATED TO THE OPERATION OF HARLAN COUNTY LAKE FOR COMPACT CALL YEARS (2016) 
[hereinafter RRCA HCL Resolution of August 24, 2016], http://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-
source/iwi---republican-river-compact/final_resolution_hcl_20160823.pdf?sfvrsn=4 [https://perma.cc/
2DC2-A5VH]. The resolution is effective for four years. Id. at 3. 
 435. Id, at 1. 
 436. Id, at 1–2. 
 437. Id, at 2–3. 
 438. Id. 
 439. Id, at 2. 
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. at 3. 
 442. Id. 
Winter 2017 POLITICAL CULTURES OF IRRIGATION 71 
water delivered from Nebraska’s augmentation projects, and by changing the 
accounting methods by which Nebraska supplies water to Kansas in water-short 
years, the RRCA has transformed—at least for now—the essential function of 
Harlan County Lake. The lake now serves as the delivery point for Nebraska’s 
Compact obligations to Kansas during water-short years without apparent regard 
for NBID, effectively transforming the Compact into a delivery compact—despite 
Nebraska’s earlier protestations to the contrary.443 If Reclamation were to decide to 
protect NBID from the consequences of the RRCA’s long-term resolution for 
Harlan County Lake, the United States could sue Nebraska to protect its interests in 
the Basin.444 
6. Post-script: Whither Reclamation? 
As of 2017, the interstate litigation between Kansas and Nebraska has 
receded into the background. It remains an important and looming presence: the 
Court’s 2015 decision awarding partial disgorgement and threatening complete 
disgorgement of gains obtained by future noncompliance has justified Colorado’s 
and Nebraska’s augmentation projects.445 But at present, the Basin is now 
dominated by a proxy war between surface-water irrigation communities and 
groundwater irrigation communities that is taking place on multiple fronts. 
Through its IMP’s, Nebraska has committed itself to a strategy to comply with the 
Compact by choosing to protect its dominant groundwater interests, represented by 
Nebraska NRD’s, at the expense of its surface water interests, represented by 
FCID, NBID, and Reclamation. That policy choice has forced litigation between 
these districts and Nebraska, and open conflict between the State of Nebraska and 
Reclamation. To protect itself from the consequences of Nebraska’s IMP’s, KBID 
has agreed to Warren Act contracts; largely to protect KBID, Kansas has agreed to 
accommodate the IMP’s in the recent resolutions of the RRCA. All three states, 
apparently, have joined in a concerted fight against Reclamation, with co-operative 
federalism as its principal casualty. The RRCA has transformed the administration 
of an interstate river based on principles of cooperative federalism into one based 
on an essentially anti-federal approach, where the States have purchased interstate 
comity with a shared opposition to Reclamation. 
Will Reclamation defend its traditional interests and its duties to its 
districts under the Reclamation Act? Based on its legal position, it appears to be 
prepared to do so.446 Or will Reclamation seek less combative means to regain co-
operative federalism? It could potentially repurpose Reclamation reservoirs in the 
Basin for the express purpose of Compact compliance—to reflect the operational 
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intent of other compacts, such as the Rio Grande or Arkansas River Compacts.447 
That would amount to a tacit repudiation of the precautionary principle which 
informed the Compact in the first place.448 It might also amount to a tacit admission 
that Reclamation’s surface-water irrigation communities in Nebraska may no 
longer be viable in dry years—the all-too-common conditions which brought 
Reclamation to the Basin in the first place. 
CONCLUSION 
The conflict between Great Plains irrigation communities can end three 
ways. If groundwater irrigation communities prevail—and if Nebraska continues to 
prevail against its own surface-water irrigation districts—then their surface-water 
counterparts will no longer be viable, as depletion transforms the water rights upon 
which they depend into legal fictions. If surface-water communities prevail, then 
groundwater communities will suffer substantial economic losses during the 
decades of suspended or reduced pumping that will be necessary to restore the 
hydrologic integrity of Great Plains river systems.449 The first result would 
repudiate the states’ and Reclamation’s commitments to its surface-water irrigation 
communities, while the latter outcome would suspend the use of billions of dollars’ 
worth of individual groundwater rights and their economic benefits. The first result 
is entirely possible, if legally dubious; the latter outcome is politically impossible 
and economically irrational. 
There is room for compromise between these extremes. That compromise 
must protect surface-water irrigation communities from the excessive groundwater 
pumping that has harmed them for decades and threatens their future; but it must do 
so without imposing overly severe reductions to the pumping upon which 
groundwater irrigation communities presently depend. Colorado and Nebraska 
have followed the lead of their locally-controlled groundwater irrigation 
communities; but their compliance strategies are producing a Potemkin river, one 
replumbed on the surface by Ogallala Aquifer groundwater, yet depleted of its 
native flows. 
Downstream and vulnerable, Kansas has sought repeatedly to restore these 
flows by reducing groundwater pumping upstream. During the 2010–2015 
litigation, its proposed compliance path accepted a diminished river, but one that 
was at least intact as a hydrological system. The Supreme Court has now decided 
the conflict between Kansas and Nebraska for a second time, but it has also clearly 
decided to avoid the conflicts between these irrigation communities. Faced with 
that avoidance, Kansas has resolved to accept its Compact partners’ compliance 
plans; and so the RRCA has purchased interstate comity with a common hostility to 
Reclamation. In any case, the Court will not decide the fate of the river. The river 
lacks standing.450 
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The problem returns us to the original purpose behind Reclamation—to 
build enduring irrigation communities across the rural West. For fifty years, the 
groundwater revolution severely tested that purpose, and raised candid questions 
about whether it was obsolete. Irrigation is above all a business, as the Reclamation 
Reform Act of 1982 conceded.451 But the decline of the Ogallala Aquifer should 
revive our interest in these communities. That is because this decline is both a 
public crisis—the permanent loss of waters dedicated to the public—and a crisis 
concerning the public itself, which must resolve the competing interests of its 
surface-water and groundwater irrigation communities. Where pumping threatens 
to separate groundwater baseflows from streamflows, the presence or absence of 
those surface flows indicates whether the river as a hydrological whole can 
sustainably withstand present levels of groundwater pumping—regardless of 
whether that pumping is dedicated to irrigation or augmentation. If the river cannot 
withstand that pumping, then the river cannot endure, and the different irrigation 
communities that depend on its water supply cannot coexist. Will Reclamation 
protect its water rights to the river systems upon which its projects depend? Or will 
the states and Reclamation, in a most cynical act of cooperative federalism, walk 
away from the projects and the public purposes behind them? 
The drought has gone underground, and neither rain nor technology can 
end it. On the other side of the groundwater revolution, there is no cycle—
historical, hydrological, or otherwise—to reverse. If groundwater and surface-water 
irrigation communities are to survive and to coexist across the Great Plains, they 
will have to accept what Powell and Mead made abundantly clear more than a 
century ago: aridity requires a public that is committed to its rivers. To sustain the 
wider public that connects these divergent communities, the arid West requires 
more modest expectations from both of them and greater cooperation between 
them. That may be more than they are willing to sacrifice. In that case—if the idea 
of a durable water public across the Great Plains no longer deserves protection—
then the groundwater crisis will take care of itself. 
 
 451. For a discussion of this issue, see Kelley & Benson, supra note 107, at § 41.03, and see 
generally MACDONNELL, supra note 132. 
